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I. INTRODUCTION 
“[T]he outcome of a [criminal] case is usually determined long 
before trial (or plea), that is, at the administrative investigation stages.  If 
truth and reliability are the objectives, therefore, what really must be 
done is improve the quality of the evidence gathering and interpreting at 
the initial investigation stages.”1 
This article aims to improve the quality of evidence gathering and 
interpretation at one crucial phase of investigations: the evaluation of 
search warrant applications.  The Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
 1.  Keith A. Findley, Adversarial Inquisitions: Rethinking the Search for the Truth, 56 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 911, 929 (2011/12). 
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requirement is often portrayed as “the centerpiece of the law of search 
and seizure, and pre-screening by neutral and detached magistrates is the 
heart of citizens’ protection against police overreaching.”2  While the 
Supreme Court has expanded the exceptions to the warrant requirement 
in recent years,3 the Court has nevertheless continued to emphasize the 
importance of search warrants.4  Similarly, legal scholars have noted the 
important function search warrants play in preventing police 
overreaching and invasions of privacy.5  Search warrants are particularly 
valuable because they require an ex ante determination of the validity of 
the search before the search occurs.  This review prevents what happens 
during the search from shading police testimony about what they knew 
before the search, and it prevents the judge’s opinion of the search from 
being tainted by the police finding incriminating evidence.6 
As discussed below, the burgeoning literature on cognitive bias and 
its effects on the criminal justice system support the value of ex ante 
review of searches.7  Those who study wrongful convictions have come 
to realize that “unintentional cognitive biases can play at least as large a 
 2.  William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 882 
(1991). 
 3.  See, e.g., Wayne D. Holly, The Fourth Amendment Hangs in the Balance: Resurrecting 
the Warrant Requirement Through Strict Scrutiny, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 531, 544 (1997) 
(“despite the Court’s asserted preference for warrants, it is clear that its practice is fundamentally 
inconsistent with its theory.”).  The precise contours of the debate over the validity of a warrant 
preference and its possible contours are beyond the scope of this article. 
 4.  See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (emphasizing the Fourth 
Amendment principle that searches of homes without warrants are presumptively unreasonable 
before discussing the exceptions to that rule).  See also Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 
1235, 1245 (2012) (reasoning search warrants obtained through a neutral magistrate and proper 
procedure are the clearest indication the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner for 
purposes of qualified immunity). 
 5.  Holly, supra note 3, at 553 (“The warrant therefore does not merely redress privacy 
intrusions once suffered, but rather prevents such violations from occurring at all.”).  See also 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 n.12 (1969) (“The [Fourth] Amendment is designed to 
prevent, not simply to redress, unlawful police action.”). 
 6.  Stuntz, supra note 2, at 890 (“The essence of the warrant process lies . . . in the timing of 
the magistrate’s decision. A judge in a suppression hearing decides whether the officer’s past 
conduct was legal.  A magistrate reviewing a warrant application must decide whether a search is 
legal before it takes place.”); id. at 884 (noting the ways that knowledge of what happened in a 
search can taint the suppression hearing).  Stuntz also argues that requiring police to provide more 
information to magistrates makes it harder for police to fabricate tips from informants.  See id. at 
930 (“the more information the officer puts in the affidavit, the harder it is to lie without taking a 
serious risk that the lie will be uncovered later.”). 
 7.  For just a few examples of the recent scholarship on cognitive bias and the criminal 
justice system, see, e.g., L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. 
L.J. 1143, 1145 (2012); Anna Roberts, (Re)Forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit 
Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827 (2012); and Melanie D. Wilson, Quieting Cognitive Bias with 
Standards for Witness Communications, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1227 (2011). 
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role in wrongful convictions as intentional prosecutorial misconduct.”8  
The term “cognitive bias” refers to errors in how we process or 
remember information in ways that skew decision-making.9  More 
broadly, many legal scholars have turned to cognitive bias research to 
provide a more nuanced understanding of human decision-making, the 
law’s utility in creating incentives, and penalties that can shape decision-
making.10  This article therefore draws on cognitive bias research to 
evaluate the incentives and penalties associated with the search warrant 
process, with the goal of improving that process. 
Cognitive bias research may well help explain the significant gap 
between the pro-warrant rhetoric in the case law and the actual reality of 
search warrant practice.11  Yet the current case law on challenging the 
adequacy of search warrant information is inadequate to provide a 
meaningful remedy to the flaws identified below.  In applying research 
into cognitive biases such as implicit bias, tunnel vision, and hindsight 
bias, this article proposes both doctrinal reform for challenges to search 
warrant adequacy and changes in the way that the rules are applied in 
certain cases.  My aim in doing so is to help magistrates make better 
decisions when reviewing search warrants by giving them full and 
accurate information on which to base these decisions.  The effects of 
these changes may be difficult to measure in specific cases, but the goal 
is to improve the search warrant process in the aggregate.12 
 8.  Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. 
& LIBERTY 512, 515 (2007) [hereinafter Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias]. 
 9.  Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in 
Criminal Cases, 2006 WISC. L. REV. 291, 307 (2006).  See also infra Part III for a discussion of the 
various types of cognitive biases that may affect analysis of search warrant applications. 
 10.  See generally Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000). 
But see Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behaviorism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the 
New Behavioral Analysis of the Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 1936-37 (2002) (urging 
skepticism about overly broad statements about “the manner in which all legal actors process 
information, make judgments, and reach decisions” and arguing for a narrowing and more nuanced 
use of psychological analysis of law). 
 11.  See Laurence A. Benner & Charles T. Samarkos, Searching for Narcotics in San Diego: 
Preliminary Findings from the San Diego Search Warrant Project, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 221, 222 
(2000) (noting the gap between rhetoric and reality, and questioning whether the judiciary provides 
meaningful enforcement of Fourth Amendment principles designed to protect individual privacy 
and security). 
 12.  I do not mean to suggest that cognitive biases will themselves be grounds for individual 
litigation challenges, as the Supreme Court has been very clear in recent years that Fourth 
Amendment issues are analyzed for objective reasonableness, without regard to individual intent.  
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 n.4 (2011) (“Efficient and evenhanded 
application of the law demands that we look to whether the arrest is objectively justified, rather than 
to the motive of the arresting officer.”); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996) (holding 
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In critiquing the state of the law regarding the search warrant 
process, this article focuses in particular on search warrant applications 
based on criminal informants’ tips.13  It does so because although the 
overall use of warrants has declined considerably,14 studies suggest that 
significant numbers of search warrants are based on information from 
confidential informants.15  Understanding how informants contribute to 
search warrants is crucial to understanding the reality of how search 
warrants are crafted and evaluated.  Furthermore, warrants based on 
criminal informants’ tips seem to have higher rates of inaccuracy than 
other types of warrants.16  These inaccuracies can have grave 
consequences, including innocent individuals being injured or killed 
during the execution of the search warrants,17 innocent individuals being 
wrongfully convicted and imprisoned,18 and greater community mistrust 
that objective reasonableness rather than the officer’s subjective intent was key to validity of traffic 
stop).  But cognitive bias research is nevertheless valuable to identify what is actually happening, so 
that solutions can be crafted more effectively to change decision-making as appropriate. 
 13.  “Criminal informants” are involved in some way in criminal behavior and provide 
information to police in exchange for some benefit, often relative leniency from their own crimes. 
See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN 
JUSTICE 3 (2009) [hereinafter NATAPOFF, EROSION]. For a nuanced discussion of the distinctions 
between types of informants, see Amanda Schreiber, Dealing with the Devil: An Examination of the 
FBI’s Troubled Relationship with Its Confidential Informants, 34 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 301, 
303 (2001) (distinguishing between “cooperating defendants,” “informant defendants,” and 
“confidential informants,” all within the general category of criminal informants). 
 14.  See, e.g., Owen Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1609, 1610-12 (2012) (“What was once a ‘warrant requirement’ is now a rule so laden with 
exceptions that it best resembles a piece of Swiss cheese, a state of affairs increasingly accepted as 
the new normal.”). 
 15.  See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 
73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 657 and nn. 56-57(2004) [hereinafter Natapoff, Snitching] (discussing 
studies that show between 80 and 92 percent of search warrant applications are based on informant 
tips).  Use of informants varies significantly by jurisdiction, and some jurisdictions may rely less 
heavily on informants for search warrant applications.  See Craig D. Uchida & Timothy S. Bynum, 
Search Warrants, Motions to Suppress and “Lost Cases:” The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule in 
Seven Jurisdictions, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1034, 1055 (1991).  Nevertheless, the existing 
empirical data on search warrants suggests that informants play a significant role in many search 
warrants, and as discussed infra, search warrants based on informants may be particularly likely to 
be inaccurate. 
 16.  See infra Part III.A. 
 17.  See, e.g. NATAPOFF, EROSION, supra note 13, at 1 (ninety-two-year-old woman killed 
during execution of a search warrant that was issued based on a tip from a criminal informant and 
fabricated information from the police about a controlled buy confirming the tip); Benner & 
Samarkos, supra note 11, at 223 (an unreliable informant’s tip led to an unjustified shooting of a 
Fortune 500 vice-president at his home during a nighttime raid in San Diego, leading to increased 
scrutiny of the search warrant process in that area).  Of course, individuals who have committed 
crimes can also be killed or injured during the execution of valid search warrants, and their lives are 
valuable as well. 
 18.  See, e.g., NATAPOFF, EROSION, supra note 13, at 3-4 (discussing several examples, 
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of police in general.19  Despite these risks, my prior work concluded that 
courts fail to adequately scrutinize information from informants.20  In 
fact, the cognitive bias research paints an even bleaker picture of the 
extent to which police, prosecutors, magistrates, and appellate judges all 
lack the incentives to identify and challenge false information from 
informants in search warrants.21  Thus, while much of this article’s 
critique can apply to the search warrant process generally, the article 
focuses in particular on warrants based on information from informants, 
both because of the frequency of that type of warrant and because of the 
particular risks posed by such warrants. 
Part II of this article provides background on the search warrant 
application process, including how courts evaluate such applications 
based on informants’ tips and how defendants can subsequently 
challenge those decisions.  Part III then discusses the ways in which 
cognitive biases can affect each stage of the search warrant process.  Part 
IV provides my suggested solutions to the problems identified, all of 
which fall under the general umbrella of full disclosure.  That part 
argues that education about cognitive biases will play a key role in 
addressing the problems identified in the article.  It also argues that 
police should use a checklist to help ensure that they provide magistrates 
with the necessary information to review the search warrant application, 
and it suggests doctrinal reforms to incentivize use of this checklist.  
These reforms are aimed at helping police and magistrates make better 
decisions when search warrants are applied for and reviewed.  They 
should also help make the system more transparent, which in turn will 
create greater roles for defense counsel in individual cases and help 
scholars or others looking at systemic issues. Part V concludes the article 
including an informant whose false tips led to several guilty pleas before a lie detector test showed 
that the informant had lied and police discovered that the informant had mixed flour and baking 
soda with small amounts of cocaine to fabricate evidence of drug deals); Hon. Steven S. Trott, 
Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as Witnesses, 47 Hastings L.J. 1381, 1383-85 
(1996) (describing several examples of this problem); See also Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused 
Redux, How Race Contributes to Convicting the Innocent: the Informants Example, 37 SW. U. L. 
REV. 1091 (2008) (discussing the risk of wrongful convictions based on informants’ tips and the 
difficulties in detecting this risk). 
 19.  Id. at 1139-41 (discussing the creation of a culture of distrust and undermining 
perceptions of law enforcement’s legitimacy); Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 14, at 1628 (arguing 
that damages are an inadequate remedy for wrongful searches, in part because the cost of the 
psychic harms are incalculable: “It is undoubtedly difficult for most people even to comprehend the 
trauma of having police officials burst into one’s home . . . Victims describe the utter helplessness, 
the feeling of freedom being taken away, the inability to trust cops thereafter.”). 
 20.  See generally Mary Nicol Bowman, Truth or Consequences: Self-Incriminating 
Statements and Informant Veracity, 40 N. MEX. L. REV. 225 (2010). 
 21.  See infra Part III. 
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by briefly summarizing the issue and recommending more empirical 
research to verify some of the conclusions drawn throughout this article. 
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT TREATMENT OF SEARCH WARRANTS 
“The bulwark of Fourth Amendment protection, of course, is the 
Warrant Clause, requiring that, absent certain exceptions, police obtain a 
warrant from a neutral and disinterested magistrate before embarking 
upon a search.”22  The search warrant must be supported by 
documentation,23 typically an affidavit written by a police officer to be 
understandable to laypeople.24  The affidavit must provide sufficient 
detail to allow the magistrate to “make an independent evaluation of the 
matter.”25  The magistrate must then make that independent evaluation, 
rather than merely ratifying conclusions of the officer who drafted the 
affidavit.26 
This part provides an overview of the magistrates’ role in 
evaluating search warrant applications generally and introduces the role 
of informant tips in search warrant evaluation.  It then explains how 
magistrates often fail to provide adequate review of these applications, 
and how post-search judicial review does not provide an adequate 
remedy for these problems. 
A. Importance of the Magistrate’s Role in Evaluating Search Warrant 
Applications 
Both the courts and commentators generally stress the importance 
of the magistrate’s neutrality.  For example, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly stated the Fourth Amendment protects individuals by 
requiring “neutral and detached magistrates” to evaluate the inferences 
from the facts uncovered by an investigation, rather than allowing those 
inferences to be drawn “by the officer engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime.”27  Magistrates play an important role 
 22.  Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164 (1978). 
 23.  U.S. CONST. art. IV (providing that “no warrant shall issue, but on probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation”). 
 24.  See Andrew E Taslitz, What Is Probable Cause, and Why Should We Care?: The Costs, 
Benefits, and Meaning of Individualized Suspicion, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145, 178 (2010) 
[hereinafter Taslitz, What Is Probable Cause]. 
 25.  Franks, 438 U.S. at 165. 
 26.  See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983). 
 27.  Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (quoted with approval relatively 
recently in Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 575 (2004) and more relevant to the topic of this article, 
in Gates, 462 U.S. at 240). 
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because of the inherent tension, or even incompatibility, between the 
investigative and prosecutorial roles on the one hand, and a neutral 
evaluation on the other.28  Requiring officers to justify their reasoning in 
a search warrant application should provide transparency, accountability, 
and error correction.29 
The magistrate’s neutrality is particularly important because search 
warrants are applied for and evaluated ex parte, i.e., without defense 
counsel present.30  The subject of the search cannot be present or 
represented by counsel at a search warrant hearing, to minimize the risk 
of destruction or removal of evidence.31  However, the ex parte nature of 
the warrant process has important consequences: “The usual reliance of 
our legal system on adversary proceedings itself should be an indication 
that an ex parte inquiry is likely to be less vigorous.  The magistrate has 
no acquaintance with the information that may contradict the good faith 
and reasonable basis of the affiant’s allegations.”32  At this stage, all the 
power rests with the state,33 and the structure of the criminal justice 
system incentivizes the state to focus on the interests of victims and 
police, rather than on the vindication of truth.34  Therefore, it is essential 
that magistrates play a meaningful role in scrutinizing the warrant 
applications.  For magistrates to provide meaningful scrutiny, however, 
they must be provided with all the relevant information that they need to 
exercise independent judgment.35  That is, they must be provided with 
 28.  Robert P. Mosteller, The Special Threat of Informants to the Innocent Who Are Not 
Innocents: Producing “First Drafts,” Recording Incentives, and Taking a Fresh Look at the 
Evidence, 6 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 519, 573 (2009). 
 29.  Andrew E. Taslitz, Police Are People Too: Cognitive Obstacles to, and Opportunities 
for, Police Getting the Individualized Suspicion Judgment Right, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 64 
(2010) [hereinafter Taslitz, Police Are People Too]. 
 30.  See, e.g., Barbara O’Brien, Prime Suspect: An Examination of Factors that Aggravate 
and Counteract Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 315, 
331 (2009) [hereinafter O’Brien, Prime Suspect] (identifying as a contributing factor to wrongful 
convictions the fact that “defense attorneys typically do not begin working on cases as soon as 
crimes are discovered; instead, they begin work only after the police and prosecutors have not only 
identified but charged their clients.”). 
 31.  Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 169 (1978). 
 32.  Id.  See also Findley, supra note 1, at 914 (“The adversary system operates on the 
fundamental belief that the best way to ascertain the truth is to permit adversaries to do their best to 
prove their competing version of the facts. When two equal adversaries compete in this way, the 
theory goes, falsehoods are exposed and the truth emerges.”). 
 33.  Id.  (noting that “only the State typically has much ability to look for and produce the key 
evidence in the case”). 
 34.  See Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49 
HOW. L.J. 475, 489 (2006). 
 35.  See, e.g., 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 3.3, at n. 92-134 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing the level of detail about an informant’s 
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full disclosure. As used in this article, the term “full disclosure” means 
all known information that can help magistrates make probable cause 
determinations accurate and fair.36 
B. Informants’ Role in Establishing Probable Cause 
The need for full disclosure is particularly acute in situations 
involving search warrants based on informants.37  Informants are 
frequently “highly motivated to help themselves”38 and have substantial 
motives to provide lies, rumors, or guesses to police in exchange for 
reduced or eliminated liability for their own activities.39  Some use of 
informants may be a necessary evil, but the use of informants poses 
significant challenges for adequate judicial oversight.40 
Historically, the courts used a two-pronged test to evaluate search 
warrant applications based on information from informants.41  This 
Aguilar-Spinelli test required that the affidavit demonstrate both the 
informant’s “basis of knowledge,” i.e., the way the informant obtained 
his or her information,42 and the informant’s “veracity.”43  A deficiency 
in the showing under either prong could be remedied through police 
corroboration of some of the information provided.44  In 1983, however, 
track record that should be provided to the magistrate to avoid the information being too 
conclusory). 
 36.  It is true that practically speaking, disclosure will never really be literally “full,” in that 
there may always be additional information that officers do not know that could be helpful, and I am 
not proposing that officers be required to do additional investigation.  See infra Part IV.B.  But I use 
the term “full disclosure,” rather than “adequate” or “sufficient disclosure,” to emphasize the 
aspirational nature of my proposal, that officers and magistrates both need to think more broadly 
about what information is relevant to probable cause determinations, and that officers need to 
provide that information to magistrates in warrant applications, to help the magistrates make better 
decisions in some cases. 
 37.  See generally Bowman, supra note 20. 
 38.  Mosteller, supra note 28, at 553-54.  See also Natapoff, Snitching, supra note 15, at 652 
(the criminal justice system’s reliance on informants creates a “government-sponsored market in 
betrayal and liability.”). 
 39.  See generally Bowman, supra note 20. 
 40.  Id. at 669.  Cf. Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of 
Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 936 (1999) (describing how much 
more police officers who serve as informant “handlers” know about the informant than prosecutors 
do, hampering the prosecutors’ ability to make independent assessment of informants’ credibility). 
 41.  Bowman, supra note 20, at 229. 
 42.  Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 113-14 (1964), overruled by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 238 (1983); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416 (1969), overruled by Gates, 462 U.S. 
at 238. 
 43.  Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114-15; Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416.  
 44.  Cf. Peter Erlinder, Florida v. J.L.—Withdrawing Permission to “Lie With Impunity”: The 
Demise of “Truly Anonymous” Informants and the Resurrection of the Aguilar/Spinelli Test for 
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the United States Supreme Court decided Illinois v. Gates, which 
overruled Aguilar-Spinelli and replaced the two-pronged test with a 
“totality of the circumstances analysis” to analyzing warrants based on 
an informant’s tip.45  Under Gates, the informant’s basis of knowledge 
and veracity are “closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate 
the commonsense, practical question whether there is ‘probable cause’ to 
believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place.”46  A 
deficiency in the showing under one prong of the test may be 
compensated for by a particularly strong showing under the other prong 
of the test or even by some other showing of reliability.47  Under Gates, 
“[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, 
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in 
the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of 
knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a 
particular place.”48 
Criminal procedure scholars have extensively criticized the Gates 
decision, arguing that it provides significantly weaker protection than the 
Aguilar-Spinelli test that it replaced.49  A number of state courts have 
rejected Gates and continue to apply Aguilar-Spinelli on state law 
grounds.50  Scholars disagree about both the normative value of the two 
approaches (which is more faithful to Fourth Amendment principles) 
and the empirical effects of each approach (which creates better 
incentives for effective policing, however that term is defined).51 
Regardless, both Aguilar-Spinelli and Gates, in different ways, 
stress the important role played by magistrates.  Aguilar-Spinelli and its 
progeny stress giving complete information to magistrates.52  Gates, by 
Probable Cause, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 35 (2001) (prior to the decision in Gates, cases allowed 
for corroboration to satisfy the basis of knowledge prong of Aguilar-Spinelli but should not have 
been read, as they were, to satisfy the reliability prong as well). 
 45.  Gates, 462 U.S. at 230, 234. 
 46.  Id. at 230. 
 47.  Id. at 233. 
 48.  Id. at 238. 
 49.  See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 35, at 105-13 (extensively critiquing and refuting the 
reasoning of the Gates majority).  See also generally Erlinder, supra note 44, at 5 (providing a 
particularly thorough discussion of the evolution of the law on probable cause determinations, 
including the key role that magistrates play). 
 50.  Bowman, supra note 20, at 231 n.38. 
 51.  Taslitz, What Is Probable Cause, supra note 24, at 167-68. 
 52.  See Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 111; Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416.  See also State v. Jackson, 688 
P.2d 136, 139 (Wash. 1984) (“Underlying the Aguilar-Spinelli test is the basic belief that the 
determination of probable cause to issue a warrant must be made by a magistrate, not law 
enforcement officers who seek warrants.”). 
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contrast, stresses not burdening the magistrate with overly technical 
rules, freeing the magistrate to make a commonsense determination of 
probable cause.53  The Court in Gates also relied in part on the concern 
that Aguilar-Spinelli created significant incentives for police to bypass 
magistrates by avoiding getting a warrant and using consent or some 
other warrant exception to justify the search ex post.54 
Under either approach, magistrates must analyze a variety of factors 
that can contribute to the probable cause determination.55  Under either 
test, it is crucial for the magistrate to scrutinize the information about the 
informant, as “a court’s unwillingness to seriously inquire into the 
informant-handler relationship allows both the handler and the informant 
to misrepresent or mischaracterize facts.”56 
C. Magistrates Fail to Provide Sufficient Review 
Unfortunately, however, magistrates issuing search warrants and 
courts reviewing defendants’ challenges to those search warrants often 
fail to provide this type of meaningful review.  For example, an 
empirical study of the search warrant process indicated that some 
magistrates view their role as assisting law enforcement rather than 
providing independent review.57  Similarly, studies show that 
magistrates rarely deny search warrant applications,58 a factor that may 
sometimes be influenced by police officers “judge–shopping,” that is 
“selecting the judge with whom an individual officer feels comfortable 
or who is perceived as less likely to raise questions.”59  In the same 
study, magistrates admitted to being influenced, at least to some degree, 
by the reputation for truthfulness of the officer seeking the warrant and 
by the severity of the crime for which the warrant was sought; both 
factors affected their level of scrutiny of the information in the 
 53.  Gates, 462 U.S. at 235-36. 
 54.  Id. at 236. 
 55.  See LAFAVE, supra note 35, at 112. 
 56.  Clifford S. Zimmerman, Toward a New Vision of Informants: A History of Abuses and 
Suggestions for Reform, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 81, 105 (1994). 
 57.  See RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: 
PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES 47 (1985). 
 58.  Id.  See also Lauryn P. Gouldin, When Deference Is Dangerous: The Judicial Role in 
Material-Witness Detentions, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1333, 1369 and related text (2012) (discussing 
how rarely federal warrants are denied, including noting that between 1999 and 2009, judges denied 
only two of more than 18,000 applications for wiretap applications). 
 59.  VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 57, at 48.  See also Benner & Samarkos, supra note 11, 
at 223, 227-28. 
 
11
Bowman: Full Disclosure
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2014
04 BOWMAN MACRO 3 FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/1/2014  2:38 PM 
442 AKRON LAW REVIEW [47:431 
affidavit.60  The study also showed that the review by the magistrate was 
usually done very quickly, typically between two and three minutes per 
warrant application.61 
Furthermore, despite the repeated emphasis in the case law for the 
need to provide specific information rather than boilerplate language to 
the magistrates, empirical studies show that magistrates tend to accept 
these boilerplate recitations as sufficient.62  For example, in one of the 
jurisdictions studied, every warrant application involving a confidential 
informant contained the same boilerplate language about the reasons for 
keeping the informant’s identity confidential.63  In another jurisdiction, 
the warrant applications routinely stated that the informant had provided 
reliable information “on at least two prior occasions” and that “to the 
knowledge of the affiant, this informant has never supplied your affiant 
with information that was proven to be false.”64  The study correctly 
notes the dangers inherent in overreliance on boilerplate language: “one 
of the more insidious qualities of boilerplate presentations is that the 
affiant (officer) may take them only half-seriously, as part of the game 
that must be played, as form rather than substance.”65 
Affidavits are often drafted to reveal as little information as 
possible.  Officers in one study acknowledged that they deliberately 
provided the minimum amount of information necessary to establish 
probable cause, to minimize later attacks by defense counsel.66  
Similarly, some officers provided minimal data on the informant’s past 
reliability, perhaps to protect the identity of the informant.67  One study 
 60.  VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 57, at 48-49. 
 61.  Id. at 49. But see Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 14, at 1672-73 (questioning whether 
reports of magistrates “rubber-stamping” search warrant applications and police engaging in 
“magistrate-shopping” are accurate). 
 62.  VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 57, at 51-53.  See also id. at 52-53 (offering one 
magistrate’s perspective that he needed to make sure all the necessary boilerplate language was 
included “because once in a while the typist will leave something out”).  This description suggests 
that both the officer and the magistrate are more focused on form over substance, contrary to the 
Supreme Courts’ directives about meaningful magistrate review. 
 63.  Id. at 52. 
 64.  Id.  See also Benner & Samarkos, supra note 11, at 239 (discussing use of boilerplate 
language regarding the need to keep the informant’s identity confidential); id. at 242 (noting that 
affidavits tended to discuss arrests but not convictions when documenting the informant’s “track 
record;” no discussion of countervailing times in which the informant’s information was 
inaccurate). 
 65.  VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 57, at 52-53. 
 66.  Id. at 53 (“We were told in [three cities] that affidavits are drafted to include the 
minimum amount of information necessary to establish probable cause, in order to limit the avenues 
of attack by the defense and to protect the identity of the informants.”). 
 67.  Id. at 54. 
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even found that half of the affidavits studied that included information 
from a confidential informant were written so that no officer had to 
swear that the confidential informant even existed; instead, the affiant 
officer stated that another officer told him about information from the 
confidential informant.68  Although lawyers often draft documents to 
reveal as little as possible to the opposing side, that practice here 
contradicts the directives in case law that magistrates rather than officers 
should evaluate the inferences from the facts to determine whether 
probable cause exists,69 which can only occur if magistrates are given 
adequate information. 
D. Later Review by Trial and Appellate Courts Is Also Inadequate 
As noted above, search warrants are issued ex parte, so defendants 
cannot challenge the validity of the search warrant until after it has been 
executed.  Both doctrine and practice, however, seriously limit the value 
of these later challenges, which can take two different forms. 
First, criminal defendants can accept as true the information in the 
search warrant application but argue that it fails to establish probable 
cause.  Those challenges are typically litigated as suppression motions in 
the criminal case,70 and they turn on the courts’ interpretation of 
probable cause.71  Unfortunately, courts often rely on “somewhat vapid 
generalizations as universal principles” when analyzing probable cause 
based on informants’ stories.72  Courts often fail to look skeptically at 
other information presented by police,73 and they fail to demand full 
disclosure of information relevant to the probable cause analysis.74 
 68.  Benner & Samarkos, supra note 11, at 241 (noting that the practice has been upheld but 
that it would be preferable to require the officer with first-hand knowledge to prepare the affidavit, 
perhaps by seeking a telephonic warrant to alleviate timing concerns). 
 69.  See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 240 (1983).  Scholars in other contexts have similarly 
criticized reviewing courts for failing to demand sufficient information, such as information about 
cooperation in material witness warrants in the post-9/11 age.  See Gouldin, supra note 58, at 1352-
53 and related text. 
 70.  See, e.g., Gates, 462 U.S. at 216-17. As discussed in Part II.B above, for tips from 
informants, most courts apply the Gates “totality of the circumstances” analysis to determining 
probable cause, while a few states continue to apply the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test. 
 71.  Probable cause is a complex concept that has been the subject of much scholarly analysis.  
See, e.g., Taslitz, What Is Probable Cause, supra note 24.  As noted earlier, many scholars have 
been quite critical of whether the courts are adequately rigorous in making probable cause 
determinations, particularly in cases involving information from informants.  The contours of those 
debates are outside the scope of this article. 
 72.  Id. at 153. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  For example, in Truth or Consequences, I argue that courts analyzing suppression 
motions have not been sufficiently rigorous in analyzing probable cause in that they have relied too 
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Even more troubling, however, are the failures of the second line of 
attack on search warrants, where defendants more directly contest the 
quantity and quality of the information provided.  Defendants can bring 
“Franks challenges” to contest the accuracy or completeness of the 
information in search warrant applications.75  These challenges come 
from Franks v. Delaware, in which the Supreme Court concluded that it 
“would be an unthinkable imposition upon [the magistrate’s] authority if 
a warrant affidavit, revealed after the fact to contain a deliberately or 
recklessly false statement,” could not be challenged later by the 
defendant.76  Therefore, under Franks, defendants can challenge the 
accuracy of information provided in support of search warrants, at least 
in limited circumstances.77  Franks challenges concerning affidavits 
based on informants’ tips are almost impossible to win, based on both 
the structure of the Franks test and the ways courts apply the test in 
cases involving omitted information about informants.78 
heavily on informants’ statements against penal interest in establishing their reliability.  See 
generally Bowman, supra note 20.  I argued instead that they should consider a number of factors in 
determining whether those statements against interests really support the informant’s credibility.  
Courts can only perform that analysis, however, if they are given full disclosure, i.e. if the 
documents supporting the search warrant application provide sufficient information about the 
various issues that should affect the magistrate’s analysis of the informant’s credibility.  Too often, 
the courts fail to demand such information from police. 
 75.  See generally LAFAVE, supra note 35, sec. 4.4, at 531-32.  See also Franks v. Delaware, 
438 U.S. 154, 165 (1978) (requiring that the information in a search warrant affidavit must 
“‘truthful’ in the sense that the information put forth is believed or appropriately accepted by the 
affiant as true.”). 
 76.  Id.  See also id. at 168 (“The requirement that a warrant not issue “but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,” would be reduced to a nullity if a police officer was able 
to use deliberately falsified allegations to demonstrate probable cause, and, having misled the 
magistrate, then was able to remain confident that the ploy was worthwhile.”). 
 77.  See, e.g., Franks, 438 U.S. at 167 (noting that “the rule announced today has a limited 
scope, both in regard to when exclusion of the seized evidence is mandated, and when a hearing on 
allegations of misstatements must be accorded.”). 
 78.  The application of the Franks doctrine to affidavits based on confidential informants has 
always been somewhat challenging.  The Franks case itself did not involve information provided by 
a confidential informant.  See Franks, 438 U.S. at 156-58. The Court only made fleeting mention of 
informants in its decision. See, e.g., id. at 165 (noting that the “truthfulness” of the information 
supporting a search warrant application must take into account the fact that affidavits often include 
hearsay, information gathered from an informant, and information gathered hastily during an 
investigation). The Court expressly reserved the “difficult question” of whether an informant’s 
identify could ever be required to be disclosed after “a substantial preliminary showing of falsity has 
been made.”  Id. at 170.  Furthermore, at the end of the opinion, in explaining the various limitations 
on the rules the Court was announcing, the court noted that “[t]he deliberate falsity or reckless 
disregard whose impeachment is permitted today is only that of the affiant, not of any 
nongovernmental informant.”  Id. at 171.  As discussed in more detail below, the language in 
Franks about informants foreshadowed the difficulties that the lower courts would have in applying 
the doctrine to the factual and legal issues surrounding informant usage. 
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1. The Franks Standards Are Nearly Impossible to Meet for Search 
Warrants Based on Informants’ Tips 
Franks challenges involve heavy burdens for defendants to meet, 
even at the earliest stages.  First, the defendant must make “a substantial 
preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, 
or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the 
warrant affidavit.”79  A defendant’s claim will fail if it only alleges 
innocent or negligent misrepresentation;80 it will similarly fail if the 
court determines that the evidence fails to demonstrate falsity.81  At this 
stage, the defendant must also show that “the allegedly false statement is 
necessary to the finding of probable cause.”82  Many Franks challenges 
fail at this stage because the court determines that the allegedly false 
statement is not important enough to affect the probable cause analysis.83  
If the defendant’s “preliminary showing” clears all three of these hurdles 
(falsity, intent, and materiality), then the defendant is entitled to a 
hearing on the allegations.84  At the evidentiary hearing, the defendant 
has to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the same three 
things; only then will the evidence be suppressed “to the same extent as 
if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.”85  Reviewing 
courts presume the affidavit’s validity and require the defendant to 
provide specific allegations and an offer of proof.86 
As applied to affidavits based on informants’ tips, these standards 
are nearly impossible for defendants to meet.  First, the officer, rather 
than the informant, has to be the one to make the false statement.87  So 
long as the affiant reasonably believed the informant’s story, then the 
informant’s inaccuracy does not matter under Franks.88  Although some 
courts say that the defendant can obtain a Franks hearing by showing 
“that the officer submitting the [affidavit] . . . acted recklessly because 
he seriously doubted or had obvious reasons to doubt the truth of the 
allegations,”89  most courts rarely question whether it was reasonable for 
 79.  Id. at 155-56. 
 80.  Id. at 171 (“Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient.”). 
 81.  See id. at 155-56. 
 82.  Id. at 156. 
 83.  See, e.g., United States v. Croto, 570 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Charles, 138 F.3d 257, 264 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 84.  Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. at 171. 
 87.  See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 580 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 88.  United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo, 346 F.3d 637, 648 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 89.  Johnson, 580 F.3d at 670. 
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the officer to rely on the informant’s information.90  Instead, they tend to 
defer to the officer, even when the facts suggest grounds for 
skepticism.91 
Furthermore, when officers draft affidavits to protect the identities 
of confidential informants, defendants often lack access to the very 
information they would need to make the required preliminary showing 
of falsity, intent, and materiality.  Courts often reject claims that the 
prosecution should have to disclose the identity of the informant in order 
to allow the defendant the opportunity to make the necessary preliminary 
showing.92  Yet as one district court forthrightly noted, “[i]t is difficult 
to imagine how [someone raising a Franks claim] could hope to make 
the substantial showing necessary . . . without at least some access to the 
confidential informant.”93 
These standards can even be used to shield police who make up the 
informant entirely.94  “If an informant’s identity—or very existence—is 
unknown, a defendant obviously lacks the very information necessary to 
determine the source of the false statements.”95  Therefore, the courts 
create an impossible burden when they require a defendant to disprove 
every possibility besides the officer making intentionally or recklessly 
false statements just to get a hearing.  This burden effectively “enable[s] 
the officer to insulate perjury from discovery by the simple expedient of 
a fabricated informant.”96 
Although the picture is bleak in most jurisdictions, a few 
jurisdictions have recognized the real difficulties imposed by these 
standards in informant cases.97  For example, the First Circuit explicitly 
 90.  See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 208 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Akinkoye, 185 F.3d 192, 198-99 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 91.  See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 676-78 (3d Cir. 1993) (defendant’s Franks 
motion factual showing significantly undercut the informant’s story, and the officer’s writing of the 
affidavit contained other inaccuracies, which should undercut the deference shown to the officer, 
but the court affirmed the trial court’s refusal to grant a Franks hearing). Even when courts do grant 
a hearing in these circumstances, they still tend to defer to the officer’s statements even when the 
facts suggest reasonable grounds for skepticism. See, e.g., State v. Klar, 400 So. 2d 610, 612-13 (La. 
1981) (court accepted testimony of affiant rather than defendant, informant, and other witnesses). 
 92.  See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 679-80 (3d Cir. 1993) (disclosure of 
informant’s identity under Franks only required after defendant makes substantial preliminary 
showing). 
 93.  Rodriguez v. City of Springfield, 127 F.R.D. 426, 429 (D. Mass. 1989). 
 94.  See, e.g., People v. Lucente, 506 N.E.2d 1269, 1275 (Ill. 1987). 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id.  Of course, if police fabricate the existence of an informant in support of a search 
warrant application, that would be intentional wrongdoing rather than the result of cognitive bias.  
 97.  See, e.g., United States v. Higgins, 995 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Manning, 79 F.3d 212. 220 (1st Cir. 1996).  See also Lucente, 506 N.E.2d at 1275-76 (collecting 
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grants discretion to its trial courts to order an in-camera hearing to test 
the credibility of the officer-affiant, and even the informant.98  In 
justifying its decision to allow for in-camera questioning of the officer in 
the case about the informant’s identity and information, the court noted 
that “[i]nformants may have many motives for misleading the police, 
and even the most conscientious officer may be tempted to wink at the 
improprieties of an informant. If the court is going to be honest about the 
realities of law enforcement in this area, the risk of abuse must be 
confronted.”99 
2. Franks Is Even Harder to Meet in Omissions Cases 
Although Franks dealt with affirmatively false statements, lower 
courts have logically extended the doctrine to apply to “material 
omissions,” i.e., omissions of information that would be material to the 
court’s analysis.100  After all, significant omissions of information can 
mislead magistrates who rely on the government to “present the full case 
for its belief in probable cause, including any contraindications.”101  
Many Franks challenges regarding material omissions deal with 
omissions of information regarding informants.102 
However, some circuits state explicitly that “there is a higher bar 
for obtaining a Franks hearing [based on] an allegedly material omission 
as opposed to an allegedly false affirmative statement.”103  These courts 
justify the “higher bar” for omissions cases by citing concerns about 
“endless” Franks litigation about what might have benefited the 
defendant,104 even though that does not seem to be a realistic fear given 
how hard other Franks challenges are to win. 
But the line between omissions and affirmative misstatements is 
often a very fine one.105  For example, the Eighth Circuit concluded that 
other state court cases). 
 98.  Manning, 79 F.3d at 220. 
 99.  Rodriguez, 127 F.R.D. at 430. 
 100.  LAFAVE, supra note 34, sec. 4.4, at n.48 and accompanying text. 
 101.  United States v. Nelson-Rodriguez, 319 F.3d 12, 33 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 102.  See, e.g., United States v. Croto, 570 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2009) (defendant argued that 
information regarding informant bias should have been included in the affidavit); United States v. 
Trujillo, 376 F.3d 593, 602 (6th Cir. 2004) (defendant argued she should have been entitled to a 
Franks hearing because affidavit failed to include informants’ previous explanations and allegations 
regarding who else was involved in drug distribution). 
 103.  See, e.g., United States v. Fowler, 535 F.3d 408, 415 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 104.  See, e.g., United States v. Atkin, 107 F.3d 1213, 1217 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 301 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Owens, 882 F.2d 1493, 1498-99 (10th 
Cir. 1989); United States v. Reivich, 793 F.2d 957, 961 (8th Cir. 1986). 
 105.  See LAFAVE, supra note 35, at sec. 4.4 notes 70-71 and accompanying text. 
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“[s]tating that an informant has not given false information even though 
he has never given information in the past does not amount to a false or 
reckless omission of relevant information.”106  But the court could have, 
and probably should have, considered that a false statement, not an 
omission, as the defendant challenged the accuracy of a specific 
statement in the affidavit rather than the failure to include any 
information on a topic.107  This classification matters because an 
affidavit with “knowing falsehoods in it . . . should not be open to 
rehabilitation by a process of substituting for the affiant’s lies other 
information which is really the truth from which he deliberately 
departed.”108 
Additionally, courts routinely reject the significance of information 
about informants that defendants allege should have been included.  For 
example, courts routinely reject as insufficient defendants’ claims that 
the affidavit should have included information about the informant’s 
bias or motive to lie.109  Similarly, courts routinely reject claims that the 
affidavit should have addressed the informant’s deal with police, to 
provide information in exchange for some benefit, like leniency110 or 
payment.111  As I explained in my prior article, however, these matters 
are highly relevant to analyzing the informant’s reliability, which is part 
of the overall probable cause analysis.112 
 106.  United States v. Underwood, 364 F.3d 956, 964 (8th Cir. 2004) cert. granted, judgment 
vacated sub nom. Carpenter v. United States, 543 U.S. 1108 (2005) (on other grounds). 
 107.  See Underwood, 364 F.3d at 964. 
 108.  LAFAVE, supra note 35, at sec. 4.4, at 552. 
 109.  See, e.g., United States v. Croto, 570 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2009) (defendant claimed 
informants were biased against him because they were tired of him selling marijuana); State v. 
Lease, 472 S.E. 2d 59, 62-63 (La. 1996) (omission of fact that informant was extremely agitated 
because of her desire to remove her child from the home of the defendant, the child’s father, was not 
fatal to validity of the warrant). 
 110.  See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 297 F.3d 790, 795 (8th Cir. 2002) (“search warrant 
affidavits need not provide judicial officers with all the details of bargaining between police and 
arrested persons from whom they are seeking to get information”); United States v. Legualt, 323 F. 
Supp. 2d 217, 226 (D. Mass 2004) (defendant argued affidavit should have included information re. 
favorable bail conditions informant received in exchange for information; court found that would 
have “enhanced her credibility rather than weakened it because it provides an incentive to give 
accurate information); State v. Grimshaw, 515 A.2d 1201, 1203-04 (N.H. 1986) (omission of fact 
that charges against informant were dropped in exchange for information did not matter because the 
magistrate was informed that the informant had been arrested). 
 111.  United States v. Muldoon, 931 F.2d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 1991) (while evidence that 
informant and his wife were paid had “some bearing on [the informant’s] credibility,” omitting that 
information from the affidavit was not fatal to probable cause because of the other evidence against 
the defendant); State v. Garberding, 801 P.2d 583, 586 (Mont. 1990) (omission of fact that 
informant was paid for information was not material because it did not cast doubt on the informant’s 
reliability). 
 112.  See Bowman, supra note 20, at Part III.C.4, regarding how courts should analyze 
 
18
Akron Law Review, Vol. 47 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol47/iss2/4
04 BOWMAN MACRO 3 FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/1/2014  2:38 PM 
2014] FULL DISCLOSURE 449 
Thus, despite the language in case law and scholarship about the 
importance of magistrate review of search warrant applications, there are 
significant flaws in the actual practices related to search warrants, from 
their preparation and issuance through judicial review.  While some of 
these problems may come from deliberate choices by police officers, 
magistrates, and judges, recent research into cognitive biases suggests 
another possible explanation for these failings.113  This research suggests 
that many of the errors in the criminal justice system result not from 
maliciousness or even indifference, but from the combination of human 
cognitive limits and institutional pressures.114  The next part describes 
that cognitive bias research and how it sheds light on each stage of the 
search warrant process. 
III. COGNITIVE BIAS LIKELY AFFECTS EACH STAGE OF THE SEARCH 
WARRANT PROCESS 
Social science research over the last few decades has compellingly 
shown that “human decision makers are imperfect utility-maximizers 
and suffer systematically from a series of cognitive biases.”115  As noted 
above, cognitive bias means errors in how we process or remember 
information that skew decisions in a predictable direction.116  Research 
suggests that the way the human mind works poses obstacles to good 
informants’ motivations when assessing the informants’ reliability. Specifically, informants’ 
motives the informants’ motives can directly undercut that reliability determination, in that their 
motives may lead them to provide rumors, guesses, or deliberately false information if they believe 
that such information will not be held against them if it proves to be incorrect. 
 113.  Cf. Susan Bandes, Framing Wrongful Convictions, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 5, 19-23 
(discussing the tension in trying to motivate reform between focusing on and labeling individual 
intentional conduct versus focusing on and highlighting structural and institutional factors that 
contribute to wrongful convictions and procedural injustice).  I similarly try to keep the focus in this 
article on wrongs that could be caused by cognitive bias rather than intentional wrongdoing, 
although the line between the two can sometimes be fine, and it is sometimes helpful to explore how 
the two can be closely connected. 
 114.  Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 307. 
 115.  Alafair Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. 
REV. 183, 195 (2007) [hereinafter Burke, Prosecutorial Passion]. 
 116.  See Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 307-08. See also id. at n.9 (“In some contexts, 
biases may be desirable when they run in the direction of errors that are less costly than their 
opposites.”).  Some authors use the term “bounded rationality” rather than “cognitive bias” to refer 
to these limits on our ability to process and remember information.  See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass 
R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1447 (1998).  Both these terms highlight different aspects of the problem, with “bounded 
rationality” highlighting the flaws in expecting perfect rationality from people.  However, I have 
chosen to use the term “cognitive bias” because it is more commonly used in the legal literature and 
it emphasizes the way that decisions can be skewed. 
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decision-making, but poor decision-making is not inevitable.117  This 
research “does not absolve actors in the criminal justice system from 
responsibility” but instead “demands that we become aware of these 
cognitive processes . . . and that we search for ways to neutralize 
them.”118  Unfortunately, both structural features of the criminal justice 
system and policy choices within it exacerbate rather than mitigate 
cognitive biases.119 
These features and choices likely affect the search warrant process 
in a number of ways, as described below.  Specifically, implicit bias 
likely affects who police target for searching.  Police preparing warrants 
may be affected by tunnel vision.  Magistrate review may be affected by 
framing, priming, and implicit biases.  In addition, post-search review 
may be particularly affected by confirmation and hindsight biases. 
A. Implicit Bias Likely Affects Who Is Targeted for Searching 
Much of the recent literature applying social science research has 
focused on implicit bias.120  The foundational article on the subject 
defined implicit biases as “discriminatory biases based on implicit 
attitudes or implicit stereotypes.”121  As the name suggests, implicit 
biases involve unconscious rather than conscious mental processes; these 
unconscious processes allow implicit attitudes to affect decision-making 
unnoticed.122  Thus, implicit bias “can produce behavior that diverges 
from a person’s avowed or endorsed beliefs or principles.”123 
Although implicit bias can involve other types of disadvantaged 
 117.  See, e.g., Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore 
Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 
1292 (2005) (“As with all of our results, the data suggest potential obstacles to good decision 
making, more so than providing definitive evidence of poor decision making.”). 
 118.  Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 322. 
 119.  Id. at 322. 
 120.  See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 7; Hon. John F. Irwin & Daniel L. Real, Unconscious 
Influences on Judicial Decision-Making: The Illusion of Objectivity, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 3 
(2010); and Anthony Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 
94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 951 (2006). 
 121.   Greenwald &Krieger, supra note 120, at 951. 
 122.  Irwin & Real, supra note 120, at 3. 
 123.  Id. See also Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 120, at 954-55 (arguing that “implicit 
measures of bias have relatively greater predictive validity than explicit measures in situations that 
are socially sensitive, like racial interactions, where impression-management processes might 
inhibit people from expressing negative attitudes or unattractive stereotypes.”); Robert J. Smith & 
Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 
35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 803 (2012) (noting that “the IAT’s popularity among scholars as a 
symbol of inequality may be traced to its success in predicting the way people make decisions.”). 
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groups, such as gender or age,124 much of the application to the criminal 
justice system has focused on race.  Research shows that despite our best 
intentions, we often classify information about people in racially biased 
ways.125  The magnitude of the results for race-based implicit bias is 
striking: “with one notable exception, the percentage of respondents who 
display implicit race bias varies relatively little across groups 
categorized by varied age, sex, and educational attainment.  African 
Americans constitute the only subgroup of respondents who do not show 
substantial implicit pro-[European-American] race bias” on the major 
assessment tool for detecting implicit bias.126  Judges are not immune 
from this race-based implicit bias; a study of judges demonstrated a 
similarly strong level of implicit bias.127  These implicit biases can lead 
people to discriminate against African Americans even when that is 
contrary to one’s conscious commitments.128 
Implicit bias may affect the search warrant process in a number of 
ways, primarily connected with who is targeted for searching.  The San 
Diego Search Warrant study,129 which is the best current source of 
empirical evidence on these issues, showed that that Whites were 
significantly under-represented while Blacks and Hispanics were 
significantly over-represented as targets of narcotics search warrants 
compared to the population of the county as a whole.130  Similarly, 
 124.  See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 120, at 955 (“Second, the IAT measures 
consistently revealed greater bias in favor of the relatively advantaged group (averaging almost 
three-quarters of respondents across all the topics) than did the explicit measures (for which an 
average of slightly over one-third of respondents showed bias favoring advantaged groups)).” 
 125.  Smith & Levinson, supra note 123, at 797. 
 126.  Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 120, at 956. 
 127.  Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1195, 1210-11 (2009) (noting that white judges displayed “a statistically 
significantly stronger white preference than that observed among a sample of white subjects 
obtained” through administration of the test on the Internet, while Black judges’ IAT scores were 
comparable to the scores of Blacks obtained on the Internet).  See id. at 1211 (offering reasons why 
the statistically significant difference did not necessarily mean that White judges harbored “more 
intense White preferences than the general population”). 
 128.  Id. at 1197. 
 129.  The San Diego Search Warrant Study began over concerns about innocent citizens being 
injured or killed because of being erroneously targeted for drug raids conducted based on search 
warrants.  Laurence A. Benner, Racial Disparity in Narcotics Search Warrants, 6 J. GENDER RACE 
& JUST. 183, 184-85 (2002). The results of that study were published in two articles, one in the 
Journal of Gender, Race, and Justice, id., and the other in the California Western Law Review, 
Benner & Samarkos, supra note 11.  More empirical research is needed on search warrants.  See 
Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux, supra note 18, at 1131 n.279. 
 130.  Benner, supra note 129, at 215 (Whites made up nearly two-thirds of the county’s 
population but only thirty-five percent of search warrant targets; Blacks made up six percent of 
county population and twenty percent of search warrant targets; Hispanics were twenty-four percent 
of county population and forty-three percent of search warrant targets).  See also id. at 194 (forty-
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narcotics search warrant applications were frequently targeted at 
minority areas of San Diego while only three percent of the search 
warrant applications targeted a largely White suburban area.131 
Some of these racial disparities may stem from explicit racial bias, 
but it seems likely that implicit racial bias plays a very significant 
role.132  Professor Andrew Taslitz uses the term “subconscious profiling” 
to describe the implicit bias concept that “even consciously well-
meaning, anti-racist officers nevertheless find themselves drawn to black 
skin as an indicator of criminality.”133  Whether racial profiling is done 
consciously or subconsciously, however, the effect is the same, in that 
police focus more attention on Blacks than Whites and therefore find 
more evidence of crimes committed by Blacks rather than Whites.134  
This leads to a “ratchet effect,” where police devote even more resources 
to the group that seems to be offending at higher rates, and thereby 
discover even more crime, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy with racial 
effects even without racial animus.135 
The racial disparity in targeting cannot be attributed to a higher 
success rate for searches of minorities, as the empirical data showed that 
the opposite was true.  Although minority areas and suspects were more 
frequently targeted, the searches of White targets were far more 
successful than the searches of either Black or Hispanic targets in 
turning up the drug sought by the warrant.136  Taslitz noted that this data 
“should direct police resources toward white suspects as a more efficient 
target for maximizing the success of searches,” even though that did not 
five percent of the county population was non-white, but eighty-one percent of the search warrants 
for narcotics targeted non-Whites, while Blacks and Hispanics together made up less than a third of 
the county population but more than eighty percent of the narcotics search warrant targets). 
 131.  Id. at 190. 
 132.  Both Professor Benner, the study’s author, and Professor Andrew Taslitz conclude that 
this data suggested that there was at least some level of implicit bias leading to the increased 
targeting of minority rather than White residents in these search warrant applications.  See id. at 
223-24; Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux, supra note 18, at 1099, 1125. 
 133.  Id. at 1099. 
 134.  See id. 
 135.  Id. at 1114. 
 136.  Benner, supra note 129, at 203 (“Over half (53%) of the warrants targeting Whites were 
successful.  However, little more than one third (36%) of the warrants targeting Hispanics and only 
about one in four (28%) of the warrants targeting Blacks resulted in discovery of the drug sought by 
the warrant.”).  See also id. at 219 (“Over two-thirds (69%) of all warrants targeting Whites 
recovered their target.  However, less than half of the warrants targeting Hispanic suspects and less 
than one-third (32%) of the warrants targeting Black suspects were successful in recovering their 
targets.”).  The article does not explain the difference in these two sets of figures, although it may 
have to do with how the authors treated warrants that were not executed.  Compare id. at n.25 
(breaking the results into successful, unsuccessful, and unexecuted warrants) with id. at n.96 
(discussing the high percentage of warrants issued against Black targets that were never executed).  
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happen.137  Instead, police seemed to make decisions about where to 
devote resources based on their perceptions of “where they perceive the 
work is,” and those perceptions may well have been influenced by 
implicit racial bias.138 
The use of confidential informants can exacerbate implicit racial 
bias.  In attempting to explain the findings described above about racial 
disparities, Professor Benner discussed the connection between 
confidential informants and race: “Because every racial group has drug 
users and sellers among them, if Blacks and Hispanics are stopped on 
the street disproportionately to their percentage of the population, this 
could be expected to produce a disproportionate number of Black and 
Hispanic informants.”139  The article then detailed findings that 
confirmed the disproportionate number of stops for Black and Hispanic 
drivers as compared to White drivers, and the higher incidences of 
vehicle searches for these groups as compared to White drivers.140 
The racial disparity in informant usage may play some role in 
accounting for the differential success rates between the White and 
minority defendants targeted.  Search warrants targeting minority inner 
city zip codes often involved anonymous tips, but only twenty-seven 
percent of the warrants initiated by an anonymous tip led to a successful 
search.141  Confidential informants were often used in these inner-city 
cases, including to confirm information from the anonymous tip,142 
although the study did not provide information about success rates when 
confidential criminal informants were used.143  Taslitz suggests, 
however, that the use of confidential informants may contribute to lower 
success rates than those for search warrants based on other types of 
information because “many of the confidential informants’ tips are from 
 137.  Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux, supra note 18, at 1125-26.  
 138.  Benner, supra note 129, at 223-24. 
 139.  Id. at 201. See also Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux, supra note 18, at 1145 (“Snitches 
snitch on those they know, and since the police disproportionately focus on racial minorities as the 
pool from which to recruit snitches, snitches tend to snitch on other persons who belong to similar 
racial minorities.”). 
 140.  Benner, supra note 129, at 201.  See also Kevin R. Johnson, The Case for African 
American and Latina/o Cooperation in Challenging Racial Profiling in Law Enforcement, 55 FLA. 
L. REV. 341, 344 (2003) (citing studies showing that blacks, Latinos, and Asians are stopped 
approximately eight to ten times as whites in some jurisdictions). 
 141.  Benner, supra note 129, at 203. 
 142.  Id. at 200. 
 143.  See id. at 200-01.  The police do not know the identities of truly anonymous informants, 
Bowman, supra note 20, at 258, while they do know and actively protect the identities of 
confidential informants, many of whom fall within the category of criminal informants who can 
continue to engage in criminal activities while providing information to the police, id. at 227-28. 
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drug users caught in the act and seeking police incentives in exchange 
for information, the sort of deal [that is] . . . likely to produce false tips 
free of the fear of discovery via cross-examination precisely because the 
informant’s identity is kept ‘confidential.’144 
B. Police Preparing Warrant Applications Are Likely Affected by Tunnel 
Vision 
Police are unlikely to recognize the role that implicit bias may play 
in their selection of search warrant targets and information sources, in 
part because of a phenomenon commonly referred to as “tunnel 
vision.”145  “Tunnel vision” is essentially a filter through which people 
understand information, in this context information from police 
investigations.146  Tunnel vision can profoundly shape investigations and 
prosecutions:147 
Investigators focus on a suspect, select and filter the evidence that will 
“build a case” for conviction, while ignoring or suppressing evidence 
that points away from guilt. This drive to confirm a preconceived be-
lief in guilt adversely impacts . . . witness interviews, eyewitness pro-
cedures, interrogation of suspects, and the management of informers in 
ways that have been identified in virtually all known cases of wrongful 
conviction.148 
It is helpful to look at the different types of cognitive biases that make 
up tunnel vision before examining their effect on the preparation of 
 144.  Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux, supra note 18, at 1225-26.  See also id. at 1107 (arguing 
that “proportionately more blacks than whites will face the risks of an innocent man being fingered 
by a lying or mistaken tipster that are inherent in reliance on informants.”). 
 145.  See, e.g., Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 317-19; Dianne L. Martin, Lessons About 
Justice from the “Laboratory” of Wrongful Convictions: Tunnel Vision, the Construction of Guilt 
and Informer Evidence, 70 UMKC L. REV. 847, at 849 (2002). 
 146.  Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 292. As described below, tunnel vision can affect 
prosecutors, magistrates, and even reviewing judges as well. 
 147.  BRUCE A. MACFARLANE, WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: THE EFFECT OF TUNNEL VISION 
AND PREDISPOSING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 20, 34, 45 (2008), 
available at http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/goudge/policy_research/pdf/ 
Macfarlane_Wrongful-Convictions.pdf (“Tunnel vision often originates during the investigative 
stage.  As later processes in the criminal justice system feed off the information generated at this 
stage, investigative tunnel vision will often set off a chain reaction that reverberates throughout the 
system.”). 
 148.  Martin, supra note 145, at 848. The leading legal scholars on the issue of tunnel vision, 
Findley and Scott, have correctly urged that more attention be paid to the ways in which tunnel 
vision affects criminal cases at all stages, as only then can one evaluate the costs and benefits of 
these features and determine appropriate corrective measures.  Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 
396-97. 
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search warrants.149 
1. Components of Tunnel Vision 
One key component of tunnel vision is confirmation bias.  
“Confirmation bias, as the term is used in psychological literature, 
typically connotes the tendency to seek or interpret evidence in ways 
that support existing beliefs, expectations, or hypotheses.”150  
Confirmation bias operates on a subconscious rather than a conscious 
level; it involves “unwittingly selecting and interpreting information to 
support a previously held belief.”151  Empirical research into 
confirmation bias and the criminal justice system has shown that naming 
a suspect leads to confirmation bias, both in terms of selecting additional 
investigation tactics focused on the suspect and minimizing new 
contradictory information; the research showed that people asked to 
name a suspect early in a criminal investigation, as compared to those 
who did not name a suspect, recommended investigative actions more 
focused on the early suspect, even after new information raised 
questions about his guilt and potentially implicated others.152 
Confirmation bias is closely related to another type of bias, 
selective information processing.  Confirmation bias relates to what type 
of information people seek, while selective information processing has 
to do with how people interpret the information that they receive.153  
“Selective information processing is the tendency for people to recall 
stored information and interpret new information to conform to their pre-
existing views.”154  Cognitive neuroscience research suggests that this 
tendency may stem from the way in which the brain filters and stores 
information.155  Because of selective information processing, people 
more readily accept information that supports their hypothesis and find 
 149.  See id. at 308-09. 
 150.  Id. at 309. 
 151.  O’Brien, Prime Suspect, supra note 30, at 316. 
 152.  See id. at 328. 
 153.  See Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias, supra note 8, at 517-518 (discussing how 
confirmation bias and selective information processing affect prosecutorial decision-making). 
 154.  Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, supra note 115, at 196 (citing See Charles G. Lord & 
Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on 
Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979)). 
 155.  Bandes, supra note 34, at 492 (quoting Jonathan A. Fugelsang & Kevin N. Dunbar, A 
Cognitive Neuroscience Framework for Understanding Causal Reasoning and the Law, 359 PHIL. 
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B 1749, 1749-54 (2004) (“Evidence consistent with one’s 
beliefs is more likely to recruit neural tissue associated with learning and memory, whereas 
evidence inconsistent with one’s beliefs is more likely to invoke neural tissue associated with error 
detection and conflict monitoring.”)). 
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reasons to discount information that runs counter to that hypothesis.156  
“[F]or desired conclusions . . . it is as if we ask, ‘Can I believe this?’ but 
for unpalatable conclusions we ask, ‘Must I believe this?”157  This effect 
is so strong that even contradictory information can reinforce previous 
beliefs.158 
Some authors describe this phenomenon as “belief perseverance,” 
i.e., the idea that “[o]nce people form a belief, they may resist changing 
it even when compelling evidence contradicts it.”159  To avoid changing 
their beliefs, people sometimes fail to notice or appreciate the 
significance of contradictory evidence.160  At other times, they can create 
and rely on unlikely alternative explanations for the contradictory 
evidence.161 
Finally, tunnel vision also includes overconfidence bias, an 
extremely well-documented phenomenon.162  Overconfidence bias refers 
to our tendency to be “unrealistically optimistic about [ourselves] and 
[our] talents.”163  Overconfidence bias may explain why police 
sometimes are worse than laypeople at spotting liars, in that 
overconfidence bias may minimize police skepticism and prevent them 
from taking corrective measures to avoid errors.164  One author recently 
 156.  Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, supra note 115, at 196. 
 157.  Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 313-14 (quoting Thomas Gilovich, HOW WE KNOW 
WHAT ISN’T SO: THE FALLIBILITY OF HUMAN REASON IN EVERYDAY LIFE 84 (1991)). 
 158.  Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, supra note 115, at 197-98 (describing a study showing that 
exposure to two contradictory studies regarding the deterrent effect of the death penalty reinforced 
participants preexisting views regarding capital punishment). 
 159.  Barbara O’Brien, A Recipe for Bias: An Empirical Look at the Interplay Between 
Institutional Incentives and Bounded Rationality in Prosecutorial Decision Making, 74 MO. L. REV. 
999, 1011-12 (2009) [hereinafter O’Brien, A Recipe for Bias]. 
 160.  Id. at 1012. 
 161.  Id.  See also Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 314. 
 162.  J.D. Trout, Paternalism and Cognitive Bias, 24 LAW & PHIL. 393, 400 (2005) (“The 
overconfidence bias is one of the most robust findings in contemporary psychology.”).  See also id. 
at 396-408 (providing a good general overview of cognitive biases). 
 163.  Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, supra note 115, at 200.  “[A]ctors will tend to be less 
deterred from the behavior sought to be deterred than they would be in the absence of 
[overconfidence] bias; the bias leads them to underestimate in a systematic way the probability that 
they will be detected [and punished].”  Christine Jolls, On Law Enforcement with Boundedly 
Rational Actors, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 274 (Francisco Parisi & 
Vernon Smith eds., 2005). 
 164.  See Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux, supra note 18, at 1109.  Additionally, recent 
research demonstrated that judges displayed overconfidence bias regarding their ability to control 
their own biases.  Rachlinski et al., supra note 127, at 1225-26 (“In recently collected data, we 
asked a group of judges attending an educational conference to rate their ability to ‘avoid racial 
prejudice in decision-making’ relative to other judges who were attending the same conference.  
Ninety-seven percent (thirty-five out of thirty-six) of the judges placed themselves in the top half 
and fifty percent (eighteen out of thirty-six) placed themselves in the top quartile, even though by 
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argued that the warrant requirement and the continued viability of the 
exclusionary rule are both important safeguards against police 
overconfidence about the benefits from illegal searches.165  Over-
confidence bias can be accompanied by false consensus bias, which is 
the erroneously overconfident belief that everyone else shares one’s 
views.166  False consensus bias could lead officers or judges to assume 
that everyone views the evidence in a case the way they do, further 
reinforcing tunnel vision and absolving them of perceived responsibility 
to investigate other possibilities. 
2. Tunnel Vision Likely Affects Police Preparation of Warrant 
Applications 
Police, like the rest of the population, seem to be affected by tunnel 
vision, particularly confirmation bias,167 in ways that could affect the 
preparation of search warrant applications.  Before exploring the way 
that tunnel vision can affect investigations generally and search warrant 
applications in particular, however, it is helpful to understand why 
officers may be vulnerable to tunnel vision despite their best efforts to 
resist it. 
Several factors may combine to make police particularly vulnerable 
to tunnel vision.  For example, “[t]he sheer volume of reported crimes 
begging for police investigation” can contribute to tunnel vision, in that 
officers “are often under constant pressure to complete their assigned 
cases” so they can move on to the next case.168  Similarly, supervisors 
and politicians can be concerned with “clearance rates,” i.e., rates of 
cases solved, which again can exacerbate investigatory tunnel vision.169  
definition, only fifty percent can be above the median, and only twenty-five percent can be in the 
top quartile.  We worry that this result means that judges are overconfident about their ability to 
avoid the influence of race and hence fail to engage in corrective processes on all occasions.”). 
 165.  Bryan D. Lammon, Note: The Practical Mandates of the Fourth Amendment: A 
Behavioral Argument for the Exclusionary Rule and Warrant Preference, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1101, 1128-30 (2007). 
 166.  Jeffrey W. Stempel, In Praise of Procedurally Centered Judicial Disqualification –and a 
Stronger Conception of the Appearance Standard: Better Acknowledging and Adjusting to 
Cognitive Bias, Spoliation, and Perceptual Realities, 30 REV. LITIG. 733, 744-45 (2011) (discussing 
study showing that readers decided to interpret an ambiguous text and believed that most readers 
would agree with their view of the meaning, vastly underreporting the extent of actual disagreement 
about the meaning).  
 167.  Karl Ask & Pär Anders Granhag, Motivational Sources of Confirmation Bias in Criminal 
Investigations: The Need for Cognitive Closure, 2 J. INVESTIGATIVE PSYCHOL. & OFFENDER 
PROFILING 43, 57 (2005). 
 168.  Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 325. 
 169.  Id. at 324. 
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Victims can create another type of pressure, in that police officers may 
sometimes be too willing to accept all of a victim’s statements, even 
when those statements may be distorted by the victim’s cognitive 
biases.170  Some authors have suggested that the police cultural emphasis 
on bringing “truly guilty” people to justice may play a role as well.171  
Experienced officers may be even more vulnerable to tunnel vision than 
less experienced officers may because the former may rely more heavily 
on their prior experiences, which could lead them astray.172  Obviously, 
these pressures are not always present, and officers may work hard to 
avoid being affected by them; nonetheless, in the aggregate, these factors 
can contribute to tunnel vision. 
In particular, these pressures can make it easy to focus on an initial 
suspect or theory, and confirmation bias and selective information 
processing can then make it harder for investigators to identify 
alternative theories or appropriately evaluate the weight of potentially 
contradictory evidence.173  That in turn may affect the quality of the 
evidence gathered.174  A 2005 study specifically explored the effect that 
tunnel vision can have on police investigative decisions.175  In particular, 
the officers in the study showed bias in terms of how they interpreted 
new information during an investigation176 and insensitivity to 
potentially exonerating information presented later in the 
investigation.177 
As applied to the search warrant context, tunnel vision can affect 
police actions in a number of ways.  Once an officer forms a theory that 
a particular individual has likely committed a crime, that theory can 
shape what evidence the officer seeks to develop.178  An officer’s theory 
 170.  Id.  Findley and Scott also note the potential effects on police officers of public pressure 
in high-profile cases and of being exposed to crime scenes and other disturbing facets of cases more 
generally.  Id. at 323-24. 
 171.  MACFARLANE, supra note 147, at 25-26.  See also Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux, 
supra note 18, at 1110 (noting how police culture can reinforce what he calls the “blinders effect,” 
which is consistent with the description of tunnel vision above). 
 172.  See Everett Doolittle, Perspective: The Disease of Certainty, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT 
BULLETIN (March 2012), available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-
enforcement-bulletin/march-2012/perspective. 
 173.  See Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 326. 
 174.  See Martin, supra note 145, at 849-50. 
 175.  Ask & Granhag, supra note 167, at 57. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id. at 58. 
 178.  See O’Brien, Prime Suspect, supra note 30, at 328.  See also O’Brien, A Recipe for Bias, 
supra note 159, at 1012 (“Once a hypothesis is formed, people search for information that supports 
that hypothesis rather than an alternative.  That is, they unconsciously assume that the hypothesis in 
question is true and search for evidence accordingly.  They are not completely indifferent to 
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of the case can affect his decisions about what type of evidence to look 
for and where to look for it; “[i]mportant physical evidence, either 
confirmatory or exculpatory, might also be overlooked if the theory of 
the case prevailing at the time of evidence collection later proves 
wrong.”179  These factors could influence when officers seek search 
warrants and who should be targeted for searches. 
In some circumstances, an investigator’s belief that he or she has 
correctly focused on a suspect can lead that officer to use improper 
means to build the case against that suspect; that behavior can be 
rationalized as “helping the truth along.”180  This phenomena, sometimes 
referred to as “noble cause corruption,” involves an extreme focus on the 
“ends” of achieving justice at the expense of the means sought to obtain 
those ends, creating an “ends-based investigative culture that prompts 
investigators to blind themselves to their own inappropriate conduct, and 
to perceive that conduct as legitimate in the belief that they are pursuing 
an important public interest.”181  Tunnel vision and noble cause 
corruption together distort an investigation; once an investigator 
becomes convinced that a suspect is guilty, he or she may use improper 
methods to try to prove the suspect’s guilt, “rationalizing these steps on 
the basis that they are ‘merely helping the truth along.’”182 
One way that investigators might “help the truth along” can involve 
developing informants.  Officers may have hypotheses about how a 
crime occurred and who did it, and they may have personal contacts with 
individuals whom think they could provide useful information.183  In that 
circumstance, the officer will “typically have both the ability and some 
inclination to help the informant shape the story line in a particular 
direction.”184  Officers may do so innocently by supplying information 
contrary information, but assuming the truth of the hypothesis causes them to undervalue that 
evidence or not to notice it in the first place.”). 
 179.  Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 327.  See also O’Brien, A Recipe for Bias, supra note 
159, at 1012 (also discussing contradictory evidence being overlooked). 
 180.  Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 326-27. 
 181.  MACFARLANE, supra note 147, at 20.  Noble cause corruption can be viewed as a form of 
intentional wrongdoing, as individuals are willing to lie to achieve their ends, but it arguably falls 
within the general category of cognitive bias, in that such individuals seem to genuinely believe that 
their conduct is justified in pursuit of a greater good.  Again, the line between cognitive bias and 
intentional wrongdoing is sometimes a fine one, and it is less important to draw that line clearly as it 
is to explore the motivations behind behavior to help identify the incentives that can lead to 
adjustments in that behavior. 
 182.  Id. at 24. 
 183.  Mosteller, supra note 28, at 556-57. 
 184.  Id. at 557.  See also Martin, supra note 145, at 861 (describing several cases in which 
police leapt to conclusions about what happened, then pressured individuals to explain what 
happened consistent with that view). 
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inadvertently and by engaging in selective information processing in 
response to the informant’s story, or they may deliberately push the 
informant for a certain version of events.185 
In those circumstances, informants have strong incentives to 
provide the officer’s preferred versions of events, whether or not that is 
the truth: 
Informants have a clear interest in pleasing those who control their 
freedom, and if they can discern the expectations and needs of the au-
thorities, their self-interest mandates that they tailor their stories along 
the anticipated and desired lines. Strong incentives lead to risks of dis-
torted information and false testimony. In particular, there is clear po-
tential for these incentives to produce false evidence implicating those 
“believed” to be guilty of the crimes and for informants to embellish 
the responsibility of those they implicate.186 
Thus, a potential informant may begin by denying all knowledge or 
participation but may eventually confirm the investigator’s beliefs.187  
And while informants have incentives to provide distorted information, 
officers are unlikely to be adequately skeptical of that information.188  
Cognitive biases such as selective information processing and belief 
perseverance may make it hard for them to recognize when informants 
shade their stories to match officer expectations.189 
Prosecutors are not likely to be of much help in overcoming these 
tunnel vision problems.  Prosecutors typically have limited involvement 
in handling informants190 or in search warrant applications.191  When 
 185.  Mosteller, supra note 28, at 557. 
 186.  Id. at 552.  See also id. at 548-49 (noting that typical deals between informants and law 
enforcement strongly resemble conduct punishable as bribery in any other circumstances); Martin, 
supra note 145, at 861 (“These are common situations for the generation of informer evidence. That 
is, vulnerable individuals, faced with the threat that they will themselves be charged and 
imprisoned, offer testimony against someone else.”). 
 187.  Mosteller, supra note 28, at 557. 
 188.  See Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux, supra note 18, at 1095-96. 
 189.  Compare the discussion of noble cause corruption in MACFARLANE, supra note 147, at 
39 with the discussion in O’Brien, A Recipe for Bias, supra note 159, at 1012 and Martin, supra 
note 145, at 859-60. 
 190.  Natapoff, Snitching, supra note 15, at 652-53, 675. 
 191.  See VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 57, at 19-21; Uchida & Bynum, supra note 15, at 
1056 (noting that two of seven jurisdictions studied routinely had prosecutors review and approve 
search warrant applications prior to submission to a magistrate).  See also Natapoff, Snitching, 
supra note 15, at 675 (noting that the investigation decisions are legally considered to be police 
work and that prosecutorial absolute immunity does not apply when prosecutors participate in 
investigations).  But see Benner and Samarkos, supra note 11, at 225 (noting that 98.4% of the 
search warrants included in their study were reviewed by a prosecutor for legal sufficiency).  The 
practice seems to vary significantly by jurisdiction. 
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they are involved, they may not be able to recognize the inherent 
problems in this information as the case proceeds.192  Instead, 
prosecutors are subject to many of the same pressures described above 
regarding police,193 and their role within the adversary system reinforces 
tunnel vision.194  “The adversary system encourages lawyers to seek out 
information that is helpful to their position, to interpret it in a way that 
helps their position, and to present it, within ethical bounds, in the best 
possible light.”195  Thus, police and prosecutors are often dependent on 
informant tips and fail to look skeptically at those tips.196  Given these 
forces, magistrate review can play a significant role in combatting tunnel 
vision, but only when magistrates are given full disclosure and when 
they appreciate the importance of their role in the process. 
C. Magistrate Review of Warrant Applications May Be Affected by 
Framing, Priming, and Implicit Biases 
Magistrates are less likely than police officers to be subject to 
tunnel vision, given the different roles that magistrates, police, and 
prosecutors play in the system.  Magistrates are not responsible for the 
investigation or subject to the same kinds of pressures that lead to tunnel 
vision in police and prosecutors.197  Similarly, magistrates are less likely 
to be affected by pre-existing beliefs in ways that would lead to selective 
information processing, so they should be more able to make objective 
and accurate assessments of the evidence.198  For example, magistrates 
 192.  See Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 329 (discussing the particular cognitive challenges 
for prosecutors because of missing information or a lack of the full context of the information they 
receive from police). 
 193.  Natapoff, Snitching, supra note 15, at 676. 
 194.  Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 331.  See also Id. (“The process of being a prosecutor, 
even an ethical prosecutor, thus exacerbates general cognitive biases and contributes to tunnel 
vision.”). 
 195.  Bandes, supra note 33, at 490. 
 196.  Alexandra Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to Wrongful 
Convictions, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 107, 108 (2006) [hereinafter Natapoff, Beyond 
Unreliable] (“Informants lie primarily in exchange for lenience for their own crimes, although 
sometimes they lie for money.  In order to obtain the benefit of these lies, informants must persuade 
the government that their lies are true.  Police and prosecutors, in turn, often do not and cannot 
check these lies because the snitch’s information may be all the government has.  Additionally, 
police and prosecutors are heavily invested in using informants to conduct investigations and to 
make their cases.  As a result, they often lack the objectivity and the information that would permit 
them to discern when informants are lying.  This gives rise to a disturbing marriage of convenience: 
both snitches and the government benefit from inculpatory information while neither has a strong 
incentive to challenge it.”). 
 197.  See supra Part III.B.2. 
 198.  See Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, supra note 115, at 208 (discussing judges, but the 
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should be less inclined to overestimate the reliability of informants than 
either police officers or prosecutors who have extensive contact with the 
informants.199  Magistrates may also be better able to assess the true 
significance of information that undercuts the informant’s credibility.200  
Of course, magistrates (and later reviewing judges) do not always seem 
willing to scrutinize the informants’ credibility,201 but their position 
within the structure of the system makes them more able to do so.202 
However, magistrates may be affected to some extent by both 
framing and priming biases. Framing and priming are closely related 
concepts involving the “big cognitive difference” that first impressions 
make.203  More specifically, the term “framing bias” refers to the fact 
that people tend to view a problem differently depending on the 
perspective from which it is examined.204  Priming can be seen as the 
action of framing to lead to a particular result: “Quite simply, priming 
refers to the use of a stimulus, or prime, to alter [people’s] perceptions of 
subsequent information.”205 
The way officers draft search warrants may implicate these 
concepts.  As the officer presents the information to the magistrate in 
support of a search warrant application, the officer is unlikely to give the 
magistrate a full picture of the situation by bringing in details that would 
undermine the officer’s theory.  Instead, the officer drafting the search 
warrant will typically articulate the facts in ways that are shaped both by 
the officer’s theory and with the officer’s understanding of the governing 
law, which can hinder the magistrate’s ability to provide meaningful 
same reasoning applies to magistrates as well). 
 199.  See, e.g., Yaroshefsky, supra note 40, at 944-45 (discussing the difficulties of police and 
prosecutors maintaining objectivity about informants when they develop relationships with them). 
 200.  See id. at 932-33 (discussing reasons that prosecutors overestimate the truthfulness of 
informants); Mosteller, supra note 28, at 556 (“[b]ecause investigators rather than prosecutors 
generally have the initial contact with the individuals who become informants, critical alterations in 
the informants’ stories may occur without the prosecutor’s knowledge, which effectively hides from 
the prosecutor’s scrutiny key data for evaluating informants’ veracity.”). 
 201.  See supra Part II.D.2 and Bowman, supra note 20. 
 202.  See infra Part IV.A.2 about the importance of educating all involved in the search warrant 
process about the value of magistrates providing meaningful review. 
 203.  Ian Weinstein, Don’t Believe Everything You Think: Cognitive Bias in Legal Decision 
Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 783, 796 (2003). 
 204.  Id. at 797. 
 205.  Michael J. Higdon, Something Judicious This Way Comes . . . The Use of Foreshadowing 
as a Persuasive Devise in Judicial Narrative, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 1213, 1228 (2010). See also 
Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Power of Priming in Legal Advocacy: Using the Science of First 
Impressions to Persuade the Reader, 89 OR. L. REV. 305, 321, 348 (2010) (discussing the ways in 
which priming can affect decision-making while operating at an unconscious level). 
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review.206  Some research suggests that exposure to an officer’s theory 
of the case can frame the review of the evidence.207  The checklist 
proposed in Part IV might help minimize that potential effect by 
requiring the officer to use a standardized format to present the 
information, rather than framing it in terms of the officer’s theory.  The 
checklist may also help ensure that additional details are provided, not 
just those that support the officer’s theory. 
Priming, however, may be more serious when connected to implicit 
bias. Numerous studies show that racial and ethnical stereotypes can be 
easily primed.208  For example, one mock jury study showed that seeing 
a photograph of black skin for a few seconds rather than a photograph of 
white skin for the same period led to increased conviction rates.209  Even 
without explicit references to race, racial stereotypes can be activated 
based on seeing someone’s name or photograph.210  Thus, “even though 
many decisions are made on papers only, judges might unwittingly react 
to names or neighborhoods that are associated with certain races.”211 
These minimal references to race may unconsciously affect judges’ 
analysis of the totality of the circumstances regarding search warrant 
applications “and make probable cause appear more readily when the 
suspect is Hispanic or Black and lives in a ‘high crime’ area[.]”212  
Similarly, Professor Taslitz argues that judges may unconsciously be 
more accepting of informants’ tips implicating racial minorities because 
they play into racial stereotypes.213  In support, he relies in part on social 
psychology research into rumors, which shows that “[r]umors that are 
consistent with pre-existing attitudes, including toward racial group 
 206.  See Martin, supra note 145, at 852. 
 207.  See O’Brien, Recipe for Bias, supra note 159, at 1045-46 (discussing “groupthink” and 
studies of Dutch independent crime analysts who showed more true independence when they were 
shielded from primary investigator’s theory of the case than when they could tell the investigator’s 
theory). 
 208.  Smith & Levinson, supra note 123, at 799-801 (describing several studies that showed 
both activation of stereotypes and effects on decision-making). 
 209.  Id. at 800-01. 
 210.  Id. at 798. 
 211.  Rachlinski, supra note 127, at 1225.  That conclusion is also supported by empirical 
research showing that judicial decisions in other contexts are likely affected by priming and implicit 
bias. Id. at 1223 (when judges with strong white preferences on the IAT were exposed to a “black 
subliminal prime,” those judges “made somewhat harsher judgments of the juvenile defendants,” 
while judges with strong black preferences on the IAT made somewhat more lenient decisions after 
exposure to the same prime).  See also id. (“In effect, the subliminal processes triggered 
unconscious bias, and in just the way that might be expected.”). 
 212.  Benner, supra note 129, at 223. 
 213.  Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux, supra note 18, at 1129. 
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members, are more likely to be believed.”214  Thus, informant tips may 
trigger common unconscious associations between African-Americans, 
guilt, and dangerousness.215  Thus, even minimal references to race, such 
as names, heavily minority locations, or photographs could trigger 
implicit associations with dangerousness or guilt, even in the minds of 
well-meaning magistrates who are not consciously racially biased. 
Interestingly, an empirical study showed that when race was more 
explicit, rather than triggered by subliminal primes, judges more 
successfully controlled for bias.216  That study concluded that judges 
were in fact able to compensate for bias when they were both motivated 
to avoid seeming biased and faced clear cues regarding the potential for 
bias in a particular case.217  The study’s author questioned, however, 
whether those conditions would be present when judges were deciding 
cases in their courtrooms, rather than just in a study done at a 
conference.218  And as noted above, race is more likely to be implicit 
rather than explicit in the search warrant process.219 
D. Post-Search Judicial Review of Warrant Applications Likely to Be 
Affected by Biases 
Cognitive biases also likely affect post-search judicial review.  As 
explained in Part II.D above, once a search warrant is issued and 
executed, charges may be filed against defendants, and then defense 
counsel may bring suppression motions to challenge the validity of the 
admission of the evidence.  In doing so, they can either accept the 
 214.  Id. at 1136. 
 215.  Smith & Levinson, supra note 123, at 801-02 (discussing associations between Black and 
aggressive); id. at 804-05 (discussing a study demonstrating an association between Black and 
guilty).  Taslitz suggests that the problem of implicit bias may be exacerbated by both the increased 
role for judicial discretion under Gates and by officers’ use of boilerplate language in search 
warrants. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux, supra note 18, at 1129, n.279, 1130. 
 216.  Rachlinski, supra note 127, at 1223. 
 217.  Id. at 1225 (noting the time pressures and other distractions that might make it more 
difficult for judges to successfully compensate for bias in the courtroom than in study conditions). 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  Even if I am right about the way that implicit bias can affect search warrant analysis, it is 
almost certain that these effects will not be remediable through individual litigation challenges.  See, 
e.g., Andrew Taslitz, The Death of Probable Cause: Forward, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. i, vi 
(2010) (noting that the Supreme Court has made clear that subjective racial bias is irrelevant under 
the Fourth Amendment and has suggested that disparate racial impact would similarly be irrelevant 
to Fourth Amendment analysis).  My point in discussing implicit racial bias here is not to challenge 
that precedent, although I do find it problematic.  Instead, my point is to focus those involved in the 
search warrant process on how their decisions can be impacted by implicit racial bias, despite their 
best intentions to the contrary.  My hope is that increased awareness will in part help lead to better 
decision-making.  See infra Part IV.A, regarding the value of education about cognitive biases. 
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information in the search warrant as true and challenge whether it 
established probable cause, or they can contest the accuracy or 
completeness of the information supporting the search warrant by 
bringing a Franks challenge.  Trial courts hearing these motions, and 
appellate courts reviewing their decisions, may be vulnerable to the 
same cognitive biases discussed above, and they may also be particularly 
vulnerable to an additional type of bias, hindsight bias, as explained 
below. 
1. Effects of Implicit, Framing, and Confirmation Biases on 
Judicial Review 
The analysis above about implicit bias and priming seems likely to 
apply to reviewing judges in the same ways.  Additionally, reviewing 
judges may be particularly affected by framing bias. Framing bias means 
that people typically tend to look more favorably on the same outcome 
when it is framed as a gain rather than as a loss.220  Framing can affect 
decisions about, for example, whether to accept a settlement of a tort 
case, whether to sell stock, and whether to accept a plea bargain; these 
choices all look different depending on whether they seem to be gains or 
losses as compared to the decision-maker’s perceived baseline.221  The 
accuracy of the perceived baseline can therefore have huge impacts on 
later decision-making.222  The baseline in Franks cases is that the 
magistrate found probable cause to issue the search warrant and then 
evidence was found, so reviewing judges are likely to see exclusion of 
the evidence as a loss to be avoided.  The structure of the Franks test 
may enhance framing bias, in that the cases often stress the heavy 
burden borne by the defendant at each stage of the analysis, as discussed 
above; that structure primes courts to view admission of the evidence as 
a gain and the exclusion of evidence as a loss. 
Furthermore, framing bias may compound the effects of 
confirmation bias of reviewing judges, particularly when judges evaluate 
evidence that seems to corroborate informants’ tips.223  Because 
 220.  That research often deals with risk and money evaluations (e.g. retaining money versus 
money lost).  Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, supra note 115, at 198 (citing Daniel Kahneman & 
Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 
(1979); and Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of 
Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981)). 
 221.  Weinstein, supra note 203, at 797-99. 
 222.  See id. at 799-800 (discussing the ways in which comments made during rapport-building 
with clients can therefore effect the client’s later valuation of a potential plea deal). 
 223.  See, e.g., MACFARLANE, supra note 147, at 39 (discussing how that played out in a 
particular case); Lammon, supra note 165, at 1141. 
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reviewing courts know that evidence was found, they may begin with the 
hypothesis that the search warrant that led to the evidence being found 
was validly issued.  That belief may lead them to overvalue evidence 
that seems to corroborate the hypothesis and undervalue evidence that 
would contradict it.224  For example, confirmation bias may lead 
reviewing courts to overvalue evidence gathered by police that is 
consistent with the informant’s tips, even when that information does not 
logically suggest the informant is right about the suspect’s criminal 
activity.225  In one representative case, the Sixth Circuit excused an 
affiant’s failure to describe the informants’ prior inconsistent 
descriptions of who was involved in the conspiracy under investigation; 
the court relied on corroboration but failed to appreciate that the 
corroborated information only showed that the informant was familiar 
with the defendant generally but not that the defendant was involved in 
criminal activity.226 
Additionally, confirmation bias may minimize magistrates’ 
skepticism about the accuracy of corroborative information presented.  
For example, one study of search warrants cited positively the idea that 
police routinely corroborated informants’ tips by using “controlled buys” 
(i.e., purchasing narcotics from the location that will be the target of the 
search, under police surveillance).227  However, faked controlled buys 
have been found to have contributed to multiple wrongful convictions of 
those targeted by informants.228  Yet courts do not seem to look 
skeptically at evidence regarding controlled buys.229  Confirmation bias 
may contribute to courts’ failures to recognize the possibility of these 
fabrications. 
 224.  See Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 312-13 (quoting Raymond S. Nickerson, 
Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 180 
(1998)). 
 225.  See generally Erlinder, supra note 44 (describing the evolution of the Supreme Court 
cases on how corroboration affects probable cause analysis, most of which gave too much weight to 
confirmation of information about legal activity and incorrectly used that information to corroborate 
tips about illegal activity).  See also infra Part IV.C.3 (discussing the need for courts to treat 
seemingly corroboratory evidence more skeptically). 
 226.  United States v. Trujillo, 376 F.3d 593, 603 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that the officers 
verified the defendants’ address as given to them by the informants and the fact that one defendant 
had previously served a prison sentence for drug crimes). 
 227.  Benner & Samarkos, supra note 11, at 243-44. 
 228.  See, e.g., Trott, supra note 18, at 1384. 
 229.  See, e.g., United States v. Harrison, 400 F. Supp. 2d 780, 783-84, 786, 787 (E.D. Pa. 
2005) (defendant showed that the warrant contained significant inaccurate information about the 
first controlled buy and arguably established that it had not occurred at all, yet the court relied on 
other similar evidence in upholding the warrant without adequately analyzing whether the 
defendant’s showing undercut the reliability of the remaining evidence as well). 
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Additionally, confirmation bias may play a role in courts’ deference 
to officers’ versions of events and their failure to take a hard look at the 
plausibility of the officers’ accounts.  For example, courts in several 
cases reject without any real factual scrutiny the defendants’ allegations 
that the confidential informant could not possibly have seen what they 
said they did, so either the officer fabricated the informant entirely or the 
officer was reckless in relying on the informant’s statements without 
doing more investigation.230  Similarly, these courts reject claims that the 
prosecution should have to disclose the identity of the informant in order 
to allow the defendant the opportunity to make the necessary preliminary 
showing.231  Instead, the courts tend to defer to the officer, even when 
the facts suggest grounds for skepticism.232 
Confirmation bias may also play a role in the Franks omissions 
cases in which the courts seem to discount the value of the omitted 
information.233  If courts assume that the warrant was validly issued, 
then they would be skeptical of evidence that would undercut that 
conclusion and looking for ways to confirm the conclusion.234  In fact, 
courts routinely reject as insufficient defendants’ claims that the 
affidavit should have included information about the informant’s bias or 
motive to lie,235 information that is relevant to assessing the informant’s 
veracity and therefore the role his or her statements should play in the 
probable cause determination.236  For example, the court in one case 
concluded that there was no reason to suppose a judge would want to 
know about informant bias or desire to gain publicity for providing 
information, wrongly asserting that those motives would not lead an 
 230.  See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo, 346 F.3d 637, 645 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 231.  See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 679-80 (3d Cir. 1993) (disclosure of 
informant’s identity under Franks only required after defendant makes substantial preliminary 
showing). 
 232.  See, e.g., id. at 676-78 (defendant’s Franks motion factual showing significantly undercut 
the informant’s story, and the officer’s writing of the affidavit contained other inaccuracies, which 
should undercut the deference shown to the officer, but the court affirmed the trial court’s refusal to 
grant a Franks hearing).  Even when courts do grant a hearing in these circumstances, they still tend 
to defer to the officer’s statements even when the facts suggest reasonable grounds for skepticism.  
See, e.g., State v. Klar, 400 So. 2d 610 (La. 1981) (court accepted testimony of affiant rather than 
defendant, informant, and other witnesses). 
 233.  See supra Part II.D.2 regarding Franks omissions cases. 
 234.  See supra Part III.B.1 regarding confirmation bias. 
 235.  See, e.g., United States v. Croto, 570 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2009) (defendant claimed 
informants were biased against him because they were tired of him selling marijuana); State v. 
Lease, 472 S.E.2d 59, 61-62 (La. 1996) (omission of fact that informant was extremely agitated 
because of her desire to remove her child from the home of the defendant, the child’s father, was not 
fatal to validity of the warrant). 
 236.  See generally Bowman, supra note 20. 
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informant to provide false information rather than true incriminating 
information.237  Similarly, another case concluded that there was no error 
in failing to include information that the defendant’s granddaughter was 
going to be a witness against the informant in cases involving the 
informant’s own criminal activity.238 
However, the informant’s motivation should be part of the probable 
cause analysis.239  The informant’s reliability is an important component 
of how courts should determine probable cause, even under the Gates 
totality of the circumstances test.240  And the informants’ motives can 
directly undercut that reliability determination, in that their motives may 
lead them to provide rumors, guesses, or deliberately false information if 
they believe that such information will not be held against them if it 
proves to be incorrect.241  If that information is consistent with what 
police wanted to hear, investigative tunnel vision makes it very likely 
that the officer will not question that information.242  Courts occasionally 
recognize the significance of information undercutting the informant’s 
reliability when analyzing Franks omissions challenges,243 but these 
cases are far rarer than ones that simply conclude that the omitted 
information regarding informant credibility does not matter. 
Similarly, the courts should more carefully scrutinize claims that 
the affidavit should have included more information about the 
informant’s deal with police, to provide information in exchange for 
some benefit, like leniency244 or payment.245  For example, a court 
 237.  United States v. Harding, 273 F. Supp. 2d 411, 426, 427 (S.D. N.Y. 2003). 
 238.  United States v. Bell, 692 F. Supp. 2d 606, 610 (W.D. Va. 2010). 
 239.  See Bowman, supra note 20, at Part III.C.4, regarding how courts should analyze 
informants’ motivations when assessing the informants’ reliability. 
 240.  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230, 233, 239 n.11 (1983). 
 241.  See Bowman, supra note 20, at Part III.C.4 (noting that courts often look at this issue the 
wrong way, asking whether the informants have an incentive to provide accurate information rather 
than asking whether informants have a disincentive to provide information that they are unsure of its 
accuracy). 
 242.  See supra Part III.B.2. 
 243.  See, e.g., United States v. Vigeant, 176 F.3d 565 (1st Cir. 1999) (omission of information 
regarding informant’s unreliability, combined with information of other important information that 
cast doubt on the defendant’s guilt, was sufficient to allow court to infer that information was 
recklessly omitted); State v. Utterback, 485 N.W.2d 760 (1992) (omission of fact that informant was 
admitted liar and had confessed to forgery was designed to create the false impression that 
informant was a reliable citizen informant).  
 244.  See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 297 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2002) (“search warrant affidavits 
need not provide judicial officers with all the details of bargaining between police and arrested 
persons from whom they are seeking to get information”); United States v. Legualt, 323 F. Supp. 2d 
217, 226 (D. Mass 2004) (defendant argued affidavit should have included information re. favorable 
bail conditions informant received in exchange for information; court found that would have 
“enhanced her credibility rather than weakened it because it provides an incentive to give accurate 
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concluded that there was no error in failing to include in an affidavit that 
the informant was currently facing twenty felony charges and was 
providing information in the hope of receiving leniency.246  That 
information does not necessarily mean that the informant should not be 
found reliable, but it does suggest that the informant may be influenced 
by powerful incentives to tell the police what they want to hear, and the 
cognitive bias research suggests that the police may not be able to 
recognize informant falsehoods in these circumstances.  Another Franks 
case suggests that possibility more directly: the defendant’s affidavit 
stated that the affiant officer had previously approached another 
individual and offered him “immediate release from detainment with no 
further actions” if he would say that he purchased marijuana from the 
defendant.247  The Sixth Circuit found it “unremarkable” that the officer 
asked the individual to incriminate the defendant,248 even though the 
officer’s direct request for the informant to incriminate the defendant for 
a particular crime could be an example of investigative tunnel vision that 
can lead directly to false informant testimony, as discussed above.  
Reviewing courts should not treat such a statement as unremarkable, but 
should instead provide a more robust review of the case, including more 
carefully scrutinizing the circumstances surrounding the informant’s 
incentives to provide untruthful information.249 
Equally troubling is the courts’ failure to take seriously claims 
about informants providing inconsistent stories, given the dynamics 
discussed above regarding informants having incentives to tailor their 
stories to what the police want to hear.  For example, in United States v. 
Trujillo, the defendant argued unsuccessfully that she should be entitled 
to a Franks hearing because the affidavit failed to include the fact that 
the informants had given numerous inconsistent explanations of the facts 
regarding their being caught transporting marijuana before settling on a 
version that incriminated the defendant as the intended recipient of the 
information); State v. Grimshaw, 515 A.2d 1201, 1203-04 (N.H. 1986) (omission of fact that 
charges against informant were dropped in exchange for information did not matter because the 
magistrate was informed that the informant had been arrested).  
 245.  United States v. Muldoon, 931 F.2d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 1991) (while evidence that 
informant and his wife were paid had “some bearing on [the informant’s] credibility,” omitting that 
information from the affidavit was not fatal to probable cause because of the other evidence against 
the defendant); State v. Garberding, 801 P.2d 583 (Mont. 1990) (omission of fact that informant was 
paid for information was not material because it did not cast doubt on the informant’s reliability). 
 246.  United States v. Bell, 692 F. Supp. 2d 606, 610 (W.D. Va. 2010). 
 247.  United States v. Stuart, 507 F.3d 391, 394 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 248.  See id. at 397-98. 
 249.  See generally Bowman, supra note 20, at Part III.C. 
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shipment.250  The court concluded, however, that the inconsistent 
statements would not have negated the existence of probable cause.251  
In so concluding, the court did not point to the strength of other evidence 
supporting probable cause,252 and the informants’ statements were 
crucial to demonstrating the defendant’s involvement, as the police were 
unable to arrange for controlled delivery or other unambiguous activity 
by the defendant.253  Therefore, the prior inconsistent statements were 
arguably quite significant, and the court dismissed their omission too 
easily, perhaps because of the cognitive biases discussed above. 
2. Hindsight Bias 
Confirmation bias may be compounded by hindsight bias.  
Hindsight bias is the tendency to view an event, after it has occurred, as 
having been more likely to occur than it really was.254  Our mind 
automatically makes inferences or connections based on knowledge of 
what happened, such that things that were likely to lead to the actual 
outcome seem more important than things that were likely to lead to 
different outcomes.255  As a result, people believe that the actual 
outcome was more likely or predictable, or even inevitable, than it 
actually was.256  As a result of hindsight bias, it is very difficult to ignore 
the outcome, even when asked to do so, while evaluating what preceded 
it.257 
Hindsight bias is generally not a significant issue for police officers 
seeking search warrants, as they have not yet performed the search to see 
if their investigative hypothesis is correct.258  Nor is it a significant issue 
for magistrates deciding whether to issue a search warrant.  In fact, 
preventing hindsight bias is a major argument in favor of requiring 
search warrants rather than reviewing warrantless searches through 
 250.  United States v. Trujillo, 376 F.3d 593, 602 (6th Cir. 2004).  The defendant argued that 
these inconsistent stories should have entitled her to a Franks hearing at which she could cross-
examine the investigating agent to show that the agent acted with reckless disregard for the truth.  
Id. 
 251.  Id. at 604. 
 252.  See id. 
 253.  See id. at 600. 
 254.  Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, supra note 115, at 200. 
 255.  Wistrich et al., supra note 117, at 1269. 
 256.  Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 317. 
 257.  Wistrich et al., supra note 117, at 1269. 
 258.   Findley and Scott argue that hindsight bias can compound tunnel vision during an 
investigation.  See Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 318.  Their arguments, however, seem to relate 
more to selective information processing and confirmation bias, rather than true hindsight bias, as 
they do not focus on effects from a particular outcome having occurred. 
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suppression hearings.259  The Supreme Court sometimes makes this 
point in noting the importance of warrants.260 
But hindsight bias is at least theoretically a significant issue for 
judges who review the magistrate’s decision after the search has 
occurred and charges have been filed against a defendant.261  Judges are 
likely to be affected by hindsight bias because their job often requires 
them to evaluate events after they have occurred.262  That fact arguably 
calls into question the ability of judges to perform effective ex post 
review.263  Findley and Scott argue that hindsight bias is particularly 
serious in cases where the courts require defendants to meet a burden of 
persuasion or show that a trial court error prejudiced them in significant 
ways.264  Whether hindsight bias regarding searches is actually a serious 
problem is the subject of some debate. 
Some scholars argue that hindsight bias significantly affects judicial 
decisions on searches.  For example, Professor Taslitz has argued that 
case law demonstrates that hindsight bias sometimes affects probable 
cause determinations, for example, when courts combine knowledge of 
several officers to find probable cause even when the officers did not 
share information, or when the courts rely heavily on guilt by 
association.265  Similarly, Professor Uphoff argues that in his experience, 
judges deciding suppression motions have difficulty avoiding being 
“affected by the fact that the police, acting pursuant to that warrant, 
found the drugs right where the anonymous tipster claimed they would 
 259.  See, e.g., Lammon, supra note 165, at 1130-31 (discussing the risk of hindsight bias in ex 
post “reasonableness” determinations and advocating for a return to stronger “warrant preference”).  
See also id. at 1140 (“A simple yet effective way to eliminate outcome information would be to 
move the determination of reasonableness to before any outcome information exists, i.e., before the 
search. A stricter warrant preference, with its necessary ex ante determinations of reasonableness, 
would accomplish just that.”). 
 260.  See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565 (1976) (noting that one 
purpose of the warrant preference “is to prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluation of the 
reasonableness of a search or seizure”).  See also Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 570 (1999) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the “inherent risks of hindsight at post-seizure hearings”). 
 261.  In this part, I use the general term “judges” to refer to both trial judges hearing 
suppression motions of Franks challenges and appellate judges reviewing the trial court judges’ 
decisions.  When material is more likely to apply to trial or appellate judges differently, I use the 
more specific terms. 
 262.  Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1, 24 (2007) [hereinafter Guthrie et al., Blinking]. 
 263.  See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 804-05 
(2001) [hereinafter Guthrie et al., Judicial Mind]. 
 264.  Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 322 (discussing burden of persuasion) and 320-21 
(discussing harmless error, the prejudice prong of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and the 
materiality prong of the Brady doctrine). 
 265.  Taslitz, What Is Probable Cause, supra note 24, at 153. 
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be.”266 
Those arguments are consistent with the empirical research 
showing that judges are affected by hindsight bias in a variety of 
contexts.  For example, a 2001 article shows that judges were affected 
by hindsight bias in that being informed of the outcome of an issue on 
appeal seemed to affect their determination of the likelihood of that 
outcome.267  More importantly, a study dealing with illegal police 
searches suggested that knowledge of the outcome of a search affected 
juror decisions about whether to award damages and how to interpret the 
facts about the search.268 
But a more recent study by Wistrich et al. suggested that judges 
were able to resist hindsight bias in making probable cause 
determinations.269  In that study, judges were divided into two groups, 
one asked to review a search ex ante by asking them whether they would 
grant a search warrant, while the other group reviewed the search ex post 
by reviewing a suppression motion assuming that no warrant had been 
sought.270  Both groups were given the identical factual scenario, other 
than differences in terms of the timing of review.271  The ex post group 
was then told that the search revealed approximately ten pounds of 
narcotics and a gun that may have been the weapon used in a recent 
murder.272  Much to the surprise of the study’s authors, this study failed 
to show any appreciable evidence of hindsight bias.273  The judges in the 
ex post group ignored the significant evidence produced by the search 
and made almost identical decisions to the ex ante group that did not 
 266.  Rodney J. Uphoff, On Misjudging and Its Implications for Criminal Defendants, Their 
Lawyers, and the Criminal Justice System, 7 NEV. L.J. 521, 528-29 (2007). 
 267.  Guthrie et al., Judicial Mind, supra note 263, at 801-03.  Other research suggested that 
judges’ determinations of negligence were influenced by hindsight bias.  See Wistrich et al., supra 
note 117, at 1314 (citing e.g. John C. Anderson, D. Jordan Lowe & Philip M.J. Reckers, Evaluation 
of Auditor Decisions: Hindsight Bias Effects and the Expectation Gap, 14 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 711, 
732 (1993)). 
 268.  See Jonathan D. Casper et al., Cognitions, Attitudes, and Decision-Making in Search and 
Seizure Cases, 18 JOURNAL OF APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 93, 110 (1988). 
 269.  Wistrich et al., supra note 117, at 1317-18. 
 270.  Id. at 1314-15. 
 271.  See id. at 1315.  The ex ante group was told that the officer who had observed various 
suspicious but ambiguous facts was seeking a telephonic warrant to search an automobile, while the 
ex post group was told that the officer had relied on the same facts to search the automobile without 
the warrant.  Id.  Either officer decision would be plausible under existing case law regarding 
automobile searches.  Id. at 1316. 
 272.  Id. at 1315. 
 273.  Id. at 1317.  Instead, for both groups, approximately twenty-five percent of the judges 
found probable cause justified the search, while the remaining seventy-five percent did not.  Id. at 
1316. 
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know about the evidence produced.274 
That study did not involve probable cause determinations based on 
informant tips,275 and none of the authors’ suggested explanations for 
these results seem likely to prevent hindsight bias in search warrant 
cases based on informant tips.  For example, the study’s authors suggest 
that searching appellate review helps prevent hindsight bias.276  The 
authors posit that the suppression decision, as well as the decision in 
another scenario that showed surprisingly little hindsight bias, were 
likely to be appealed and subject to reversal, without a deferential 
standard of review on appeal, which may have made the trial judges 
more cautious in their decision-making.277  However, magistrates’ 
decisions to approve search warrants are given great deference by 
reviewing courts.278  And the relevant case law suggests that courts fail 
to provide meaningful searching review of magistrate decisions.279 
The study authors’ other explanations are similarly unlikely to 
prevent hindsight bias in informant-based search warrant cases.  The 
study’s authors posit that judges use “rules of thumb” for analyzing 
probable cause scenarios, such as refusing to issue warrants or admit 
evidence when the only basis for the search was vague assertions by 
officers about having smelled drugs in a vehicle; these rules of thumb 
may minimize the effect of the search results on judges.280  In a later 
article, the study’s authors similarly suggested that the complexity of 
legal rules in Fourth Amendment cases would stimulate more careful 
reflective decision-making rather than quick intuitive decisions that 
create greater room for hindsight bias.281  But these explanations actually 
suggest that judges may be more vulnerable to hindsight bias in 
informant situations than in the scenario in this study.  The case law 
 274.  Id. at 1317. 
 275.  See id. at 1315. 
 276.  Id. at 1324. 
 277.  Id. 
 278.  See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) (“A magistrate’s determination of 
probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.”) (internal quotation omitted). 
 279.  See supra Part II.D. (regarding the inadequacy of review in Franks cases) and Bowman, 
supra note 20 (regarding motions to suppress reviewed for adequacy of probable cause 
determinations). 
 280.  Wistrich et al., supra note 117, at 1324. 
 281.  Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 262, at 27, 29.  That explanation is related to, but 
distinct from, the first explanation, in that the former emphases mental shortcuts by individual 
judges, while the later relates more to effects from the formality of the legal doctrine coming from 
higher courts’ decisions.  Compare Wistrich et al., supra note 117, at 1318 (describing informal 
heuristics of individual judges), with Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 262, at 27 (referring to 
“[t]he highly intricate, rule-bound nature of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that guides probable 
cause determinations”). 
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suggests that judges use overly simplistic rules of thumb when assessing 
informants’ reliability, a key component of the probable cause 
determination based on informant tips.282  For example, courts often rely 
on the fact that an informant has made a statement against penal interests 
in establishing the informant’s veracity, without ensuring that the 
statement actually is against the informant’s interests.283  More 
troublingly, they often assert that informants’ statements are more likely 
to be reliable when the informant is under arrest and seeking a potential 
“deal” in exchange for information, when that situation incentivizes the 
informant to pass along rumors or even lies rather than just truthful 
information.284  In both situations, the use of rough heuristics cuts 
against the sort of detailed factual analysis that is required for analyzing 
these issues.285 
In fact, hindsight bias provides a plausible partial explanation for 
the fact that defendants almost never win Franks cases involving 
informants, particularly given the structure of the Franks test, which 
creates significant opportunities for hindsight bias to affect the courts’ 
decisions.  Hindsight bias is particularly likely to affect decision-making 
when the defendant bears a substantial burden of persuasion.286  The 
Franks test begins with the presumption of the warrant’s validity and 
stresses the heavy burden the defendant bears in overcoming that 
presumption.287  Similarly, the test reinforces that tendency by requiring 
the defendant to make a “substantial preliminary showing,” before being 
able to get an evidentiary hearing on Franks allegations.288  Thus, the 
reviewing court’s assessment of the merits of the Franks challenge on 
appeal can be colored by the failure of the defendant’s Franks challenge 
and the defendant’s conviction below. 
In fact, some Franks cases suggest hindsight biases may be 
affecting courts’ decisions.289  For example, in United States v. Tzannos, 
 282.  See generally, Bowman, supra note 20 (arguing that the courts should more carefully 
scrutinize the role that informants’ statements against penal interests play in establishing the 
informants’ veracity). 
 283.  Id. at 249-52. 
 284.  Id. at 261-65. 
 285.  See id. 
 286.  Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 322. 
 287.  Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978). 
 288.  See, e.g., United States v. Rosario-Marando, 537 F. Supp. 2d 299 (D.P.R. 2008) (to be 
entitled to a Franks hearing, a defendant must do more than construct a self-serving statement that 
refutes the warrant affidavit). 
 289.  The cases described in this part do not definitively demonstrate cognitive bias, as that 
conclusion cannot be made from the information available in appellate opinions.  Instead, the cases 
illustrate things that would be predictable based on cognitive bias research, whether or not that was 
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the First Circuit’s reasoning suggested hindsight bias may have affected 
its rejection of the adequacy of the showing that the defendant made 
suggesting that the affiant officer had made a materially false statement 
deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth.290  The officer stated 
in his affidavit that he had participated in a controlled call regarding 
gambling, in which he called the target number and listened while the 
confidential informant discussed betting.291  The trial court found 
credible the defendant’s evidence that no such call was made on the day 
in question.292  The appellate court, on the other hand, focused on the 
substantive accuracy of the informant’s information about the gambling 
operation that was discovered in the search; the appellate court criticized 
the defendant for failing to explain how the officer “would have 
obtained such detailed and accurate information” if the informant had 
been fabricated.293  Those considerations are improper because the 
informant’s information only turned out to be accurate in hindsight, after 
the execution of the search warrant, but the search has to be justified at 
its inception, not based on what turns up in the search.294 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
The problems identified above are multifaceted, so the solutions 
need to be similarly multifaceted.  As discussed below, however, all 
these solutions generally revolve around the idea of full disclosure, 
making sure that all actors in the system have needed information about 
cognitive bias and making sure that magistrates and judges receive 
adequate information about the specific cases before them.295  None of 
really the cause of what happened in any individual case.  But the reasoning in these cases suggests 
that cognitive bias may have contributed to the courts’ decisions.  Moreover, the cases also suggest 
that although not all Franks cases are wrongly decided, the current doctrine is inadequate to provide 
defendants with a meaningful remedy when cognitive biases are at play. 
 290.  United States v. Tzannos, 460 F.3d 128, 138 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 291.  Id. at 131. 
 292.  See id. at 133 (regarding granting the hearing) and 134 (discussing trial court’s evaluation 
of issues).  The appellate court raised some reasonable points about the quality of the evidence, see 
id. at 137, but the defendant’s evidence did directly contradict the officer’s version of events. 
 293.  Id. at 138.  In doing so, the appellate court found clear error in the trial court’s 
conclusions, rather than reaching this decision under a de novo standard of review, despite the 
appellate court’s lack of deference to the trial court’s interpretation of the facts. See id. 
 294.  See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (search must be justified at its 
inception).  The officer in Tzannos could not have mistakenly relied on the informant for bad 
information, as the key disputed statement in the case turned on the officer’s own involvement in 
the controlled call, so the appellate court was wrong in concluding that the defendant had not met 
the preliminary showing required by Franks.  See Tzannos, 460 F.3d at 138. 
 295.  See supra note 35 (regarding “full disclosure” versus “adequate disclosure”). 
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the suggested solutions will work in isolation, but the combination of 
these reforms should help provide magistrates with better information in 
search warrant applications, should help magistrates review that 
information more effectively, and should make later judicial review of 
magistrate’s decisions more thoughtful. 
A. Educate Police, Magistrates, and Judges about Cognitive Bias and 
the Value of Full Disclosure 
Increased education for police, magistrates, and judges is a helpful 
first step, although only a first step, in minimizing the effect of cognitive 
bias on probable cause evaluations of search warrant applications.  
Education about cognitive bias does not in itself ensure that people will 
overcome these biases, and some biases are quite difficult to overcome, 
even when people are aware of them.296  However, research shows that 
increased awareness of cognitive processes that lead to bias can lead to 
improved decision-making in some circumstances,297 particularly when 
coupled with the adoption of additional techniques to help apply the 
research and improve decision-making.298  This education should cover 
both cognitive biases generally and the value of full disclosure in the 
search warrant context more specifically. 
1. Education about Cognitive Bias Generally 
Many scholars who write about cognitive bias have called for 
increased judicial education about cognition, which has been relatively 
uncontroversial even if not yet adopted on a widespread basis.299  For 
example, Professor Rachlinski suggests that judges should be exposed 
 296.  See, e.g., Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 371 (discussing, for example, the difficulty 
people have in correcting for hindsight bias, even when they are aware of it and are specifically told 
to ignore outcome information). 
 297.  Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias, supra note 8, at 522 (“Some empirical evidence 
suggests that education can potentially mitigate bias, especially if the education focuses on the 
cognitive processes that can lead to bias.”).  Education is not a panacea, however, and needs to be 
coupled with additional strategies, as discussed infra.  See id. at 523. 
 298.  See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 203, at 822 (noting that “teaching about [framing] bias is 
less effective than training people to analyze problems differently”); Findley & Scott, supra note 9, 
at 372-74 (discussing numerous suggests for ways that police officers could approach decisions 
differently). 
 299.  See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 7 at 858-75 (summarizing various proposals for educating 
jurors about implicit bias, including drawing on work done with judges and others, and offering 
proposal for how such education should be conducted to be most effective); Jeffrey W. Stempel, 
Refocusing Away from Rules Reform and Devoting More Attention to the Deciders, 87 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 335, 363-64 (2010) (noting that proposals regarding educating judges about cognitive bias are 
relatively uncontroversial but have yet to achieve widespread adoption). 
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both to general information about implicit biases and to more specific 
information about their own vulnerability to implicit bias.300  Similarly, 
the Honorable John Irwin has advocated for increased awareness by 
other judges of the role implicit bias can play in decision-making, as a 
way to help judges guard against it.301  Professors Findley and Scott 
have similarly advocated for education of lawyers and judges, beginning 
in law school, about both the causes and solutions for tunnel vision.302  
Some judicial training regarding cognitive biases has begun to be 
offered,303 but it should be expanded. 
Other sources advocate for increased education of other participants 
in the criminal justice system.  For example, some within the police 
community have embraced the call for increased education into 
cognitive biases and how they affect police work.304  Furthermore, 
Professor Alafair Burke has written extensively about the need to 
educate prosecutors on cognitive biases and their influences on 
prosecutorial decision-making.305  Professor Burke has also correctly 
stressed that education about cognitive bias is helpful in overcoming the 
tendency to demonize those involved in the criminal justice system, 
which is often counterproductive if the real goal is to improve the 
system.306  The same principles apply here. 
 300.  Rachlinski et al., supra note 127, at 1228 (“Therefore, while education regarding implicit 
bias as a general matter might be useful, specific training revealing the vulnerabilities of the judges 
being trained would be more useful.”). 
 301.  Irwin & Real, supra note 120, at 7 (noting that judicial education “affords judges one 
more opportunity to carefully consider all aspects of the decision to reach the most correct 
outcome”); id. at 8 (“Training about implicit biases in general, how they most likely influence 
judicial decision-making and how their impact can be minimized, could become an important first 
aspect of the ever-growing world of judicial education.”). 
 302.  Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 374-75. 
 303.  See, e.g., Raymond J. McKoski, Reestablishing Actual Impartiality as the Fundamental 
Value of Judicial Ethics: Lessons from “Big Judge Davis,” 99 KY. L.J. 259, 309-10 (2011) 
(describing judicial education programs dealing with cognitive bias offered by the University of 
North Carolina, the National Judicial College, and Judge Mark Bennett). 
 304.  See, e.g., Robert B. Bates, Curing Investigative Tunnel Vision, 54 POLICE CHIEF 41, 42 
(1987), available at http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_ 
arch&article_id=2578&issue_id=12012 (discussing “law enforcement leadership initiatives and 
training programs” to address ways in which officers sometimes “cut corners” and to help officers 
“understand what is driving their decisions” in certain situations).  While embracing the idea that 
cognitive bias can affect police actions, the author unfortunately rejects the idea that racial bias 
could play a similar role, without confronting or responding to the research on implicit racial bias, 
which further underscores the need for increased education and training. 
 305.  See Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, supra note 115; Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias, 
supra note 8. 
 306.  Alafair S. Burke, New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: What 
Really Works?  Talking About Prosecutors, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2119, 2120 (2010) [hereinafter 
Burke, Talking About Prosecutors] (“The wrongful conviction literature’s dominant rhetoric about 
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2. Education about the Value of Full Disclosure 
However, this education should go beyond a general introduction to 
cognitive biases, to cover the value of full disclosure for combatting 
these biases.307  The most important of the reforms discussed in this 
article is genuine acceptance of the ideas that magistrate review of 
search warrant applications is valuable, not just an inconvenience.308  
Providing full disclosure can improve police decision-making.309  
Furthermore, police officers cannot be expected to overcome all their 
cognitive biases themselves, so it is important to get magistrates the 
information that they need to play a meaningful role in the process.310  
Providing meaningful review by magistrates, and then meaningful 
appellate review of magistrate decisions, can provide other systemic 
benefits as well.311 
a. Benefits to Police and Magistrate Decision-Making 
The process of articulating a more complete picture of a case to the 
magistrate should help minimize officers’ tendencies towards tunnel 
vision.  An empirical study into confirmation bias and police 
investigation suggested that participants who were asked to discuss 
evidence for and against their hypotheses did not show confirmation 
bias, much like the participants who were not asked to name a suspect at 
prosecutors—a rhetoric of fault—is counterproductive because it alienates the very parties who hold 
the power to initiate many of the most promising reforms of the movement: prosecutors. Fault-based 
discourse is especially misplaced in the discussion of the disclosure of evidence to the defense”). 
 307.  Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 371-72 (“In general, police and prosecutor training 
needs to place greater value on neutrality, emphasizing the need to postpone judgment, and to 
develop all the facts rather than merely building a case against a suspect.”). 
 308.  VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 57, at 75 (some officers view the search warrant 
requirement as an unnecessary intrusion by the courts into what they consider law enforcement’s 
domain; therefore the warrant requirement “is largely something to be ‘gotten around’”); Bar-Gill & 
Friedman, supra note 14, at 1614 (“Facing scrutiny from a magistrate is almost certainly calculated 
to avoid some searches that would not meet Fourth Amendment requisites.”).  See also Bates, supra 
note 304, at 43 (noting from the police perspective that “[a]nyone can attend training, but the 
leadership and the culture of the department must allow for an investigative atmosphere” that 
embraces rather than is hostile to questioning and healthy debate). 
 309.  See infra Part IV.A.2.a. 
 310.  Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 390 (“Given that police and prosecutors, because they 
are human, cannot be expected to recognize and correct for all of their natural biases, the system 
must find a way to give sufficient case information to those who have different incentives and 
different natural biases.”); Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 14, at 1641 (“Without regard to the 
quality of magistrates, a real warrant requirement will force some police officials to stop and think, 
and to articulate their reasons for intruding into someone’s liberty, thereby avoiding unreasonable 
intrusions in the first place.”). 
 311.  See infra Part IV.A.2.a. 
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all,312 but participants who were asked to name one or more suspects and 
articulate the reasons supporting their analysis did show these biases.313  
The study’s author suggested that “the extra step of actively considering 
evidence that points away from that suspect shows promise as a simple 
way to counteract bias.”314  Thus, when officers are accountable for 
carefully and thoroughly investigating, and when they are required to 
provide a more complete picture of the information they have gathered, 
as discussed in the next part, the officers may be more able to counteract 
their tendencies toward confirmation bias and selective information 
processing.315 
Similarly, full disclosure should improve police analysis by 
increasing accountability.316  Research into accountability shows that 
“when people know in advance that they will have to justify a decision 
to a well-informed audience, they tend to consider evidence in a way 
that is both more evenhanded and thorough, and they are less influenced 
by previous beliefs.”317  The effect is particularly strong when the 
audience’s views are unknown and could be skeptical of the offered 
position.318  Accountability is especially important in overcoming 
priming and implicit bias.319  Therefore, when police know magistrates 
will provide meaningful review of the information provided, they are 
likely to perform a more thorough analysis than when they expect 
magistrates to rubber stamp the warrant application.320 
Magistrate decision-making should also benefit.  Magistrates are 
obviously somewhat vulnerable to cognitive biases, as they are 
human.321  But as discussed above, magistrates should be less vulnerable 
 312.  O’Brien, Prime Suspect, supra note 30, at 329. 
 313.  Id. at 327-28. 
 314.  Id. at 329. 
 315.  See Taslitz, Police Are People Too, supra note 29, at 34. 
 316.  See Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 391. 
 317.  See O’Brien, Recipe for Bias, supra note 159, at 1018-19. 
 318.  See id. at 1019. 
 319.  See Stanchi, supra note 205, at 348-49 (citing Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Sober Second 
Thought: The Effects of Accountability, Anger, and Authoritarianism on Attributions of 
Responsibility, 24 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 563, 564 (1998) (describing a study 
involving accountability and priming)). 
 320.  See O’Brien, Recipe for Bias, supra note 159, at 1019. See also Bar-Gill & Friedman, 
supra note 14, at 1670-72 (arguing that police decision-making will be improved by increased 
magistrate review of warrants, including based on reasons related to combatting cognitive biases). 
 321.  See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Misjudging, 7 NEV. L.J. 420, 428-38 (2007) (discussing in detail 
how judges are affected by anchoring, hindsight bias, and “self-serving bias”).  Another study 
indicated that judges are no better than police officers or prosecutors in detecting lies, although 
judges were far more willing to indicate that they did not know the answers to study questions than 
were officers or prosecutors. Leif A. Strömwall & Pär Anders Granhag, How to Detect Deception: 
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to tunnel vision than police officers, given their different roles in the 
system.322  Some empirical evidence suggests that judges are in fact able 
to resist at least some cognitive biases.323  Magistrates will be more 
effectively able to resist their own cognitive bias when they appreciate 
the importance of their role. 
An important way to combat magistrates’ cognitive biases is to 
strengthen appellate review of magistrate decisions, as discussed in more 
detail in Part IV.C below.  The research on accountability is equally 
applicable to decisions by magistrates as it is to police decisions.324  Yet 
the current judicial review of magistrate decisions is often too 
deferential, such that it is very difficult for defendants to win these 
challenges.325  Judicial review of magistrate decisions will be 
particularly valuable if it focuses on the ways magistrates reach 
decisions or their reasoning, not just the bare conclusion about whether 
or not the warrant should issue.326 
b. Systemic Benefits from Increased Transparency 
Full disclosure can have other beneficial effects as well, including 
facilitating meaningful review by defense counsel once charges are filed 
and they are retained.  Professor Natapoff has noted the important role 
defense counsel plays in revealing “informant excesses.”327  She argues 
that “defense counsel should have more and earlier access to information 
about informants, including their complete criminal records, any 
cooperation provided in or promised in any other cases, copies of any 
statements made regarding the case, and a description of all promises-
implicit and explicit-made by the government.”328  In United States v. 
Arresting the Beliefs of Police Officers, Prosecutors and Judges, 9 PSYCHOL. CRIME & LAW 1, 19-
36 (2003). 
 322.  See supra Part III.B2, III.C. 
 323.  See supra notes 269-74 and accompanying text (discussing the research into judicial 
resistance to hindsight bias in the context of probable cause determinations) and notes 216-18 and 
accompanying text (discussing judicial resistance to racial bias when race is explicit rather than 
implicit). 
 324.  See supra notes 316-20 and related text (regarding accountability).  
 325.  See supra Part II.D. 
 326.  See O’Brien, Recipe for Bias, supra note 159, at 1020 (accountability for decisions’ 
ultimate outcomes can increase bias, but accountability for the decision-making process reduces 
bias by leading to more thorough evaluation of alternatives and less commitment to earlier 
decisions); Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 14, at 1639 (noting that magistrates are motivated by 
the threat of later reversal of their decisions, so judicial review of those decisions “helps align a 
magistrate’s incentives with the social optimum.”). 
 327.  Natapoff, Snitching, supra note 15, at 699. 
 328.  Id. 
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Ruiz, the Supreme Court recently narrowed prosecutor’s obligations to 
provide discovery of this type of information, holding that defendants 
who plead guilty are not entitled to this discovery.329  If the search 
warrant application more routinely contained such information, that 
would minimize the negative effects of Ruiz on the criminal cases 
involving search warrants.330 
Providing magistrates with additional information in search warrant 
applications would also have the added benefit of making the system 
more transparent and easier to study.  Researchers have noted the 
challenges of getting access to meaningful information in the search 
warrants,331 and several scholars have called for the need for more 
transparent access to information about informants.332  Improved access 
to information about informant usage in search warrant cases could help 
make it easier to monitor for racial disparities, which in turn could help 
with both perceived and actual accountability, important in reducing 
implicit bias.333  “In the end, greater transparency at all stages of the 
criminal process is the most powerful way to counter tunnel vision.”334 
B. Facilitate Full Disclosure Through Use of a Checklist 
Of course, magistrates can only take a “fresh look”335 at search 
warrant applications if they are given enough information about the 
facts.336  Police should therefore be incentivized “to collect more of the 
 329.  United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002). 
 330.  See Natapoff, Snitching, supra note 15, at 699 n.236 (“Since 90-95% of defendants plead 
guilty, [Ruiz] effectively shields from discovery vast amounts of data related to informant 
credibility.”) 
 331.  See, e.g., VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 57, at 1-2. 
 332.  See, e.g., Natapoff, Snitching, supra note 15, at 697 (“Access to information about the 
informant institution would temper law enforcement discretion and permit public consideration of a 
variety of important and painful decisions about what substantive limits, if any, should be placed on 
informant use.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 333.  See Smith & Levinson, supra note 123, at 824-25.  That is particularly important because 
there is no individual remedy for implicit bias, as noted above. 
 334.  Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 390.  See also Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions, 
supra note 34, at 494 (arguing that prosecutorial tunnel vision should be combatted through 
transparency, including increased “record keeping, record sharing and discovery . . . to ensure that a 
full investigative record exists and is accessible for review.”). 
 335.  Cf. Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias, supra note 8, at 525-27 (arguing for the use of 
internal and external mechanisms for prosecutors and others to take a “fresh look” at other 
prosecutors’ decisions in order to neutralize cognitive biases). 
 336.  Cf. Findley, supra note 1, at 939 (noting the importance of making the investigation 
process more transparent to fact-finders, which will improve the quality of the outcomes of the 
adjudicative process). 
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reasonably available information before acting.”337  One way to facilitate 
fuller collection and disclosure of case-specific information to the 
magistrate would be to encourage the use of a checklist.338  A checklist 
would clarify for both police and magistrates what evidence should be 
collected and disclosed, which would make the idea of full disclosure 
easier to implement and enforce.339  Empirical studies of search warrant 
applications also show that some police departments have already 
developed and used standardized forms, including checklists, to help 
increase efficiency and precision in search warrant applications.340 
Checklists have been recognized as helpful for police in other 
contexts.341  For example, the ABA’s Working Group regarding 
improving Brady disclosures concluded that checklists should be used 
“to ensure full and timely transfer of all relevant information from police 
to prosecutors.”342  Police members of that Working Group advocated 
for the use of checklists to help them comply with their disclosure 
obligations.343  Similarly, another ABA report urged the judiciary to 
adopt checklists to help ensure compliance with Brady disclosures as 
part of its recommendations for ways to prevent wrongful convictions.344 
 337.  Taslitz, What Is Probable Cause, supra note 24, at 171.  I am not arguing that use of the 
checklist would necessarily be required to do additional investigation in most cases.  Instead, I 
expect that in routine cases, officers would do the same sort of investigation as is currently done but 
would disclose more of that information to magistrates.  Of course, if using the checklist indicated 
to officers that they had not yet done enough to establish probable cause, then they could continue 
to investigate. 
 338.  See infra Part IV.C regarding police incentives for use of a checklist. 
 339.  See Lissa Griffin, Pretrial Procedures for Innocent People: Reforming Brady, 56 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 969, 974 (2011/12) (discussing the same benefits from using a checklist to help 
improve Brady disclosures). Use of a checklist may have the most tangible effects on individual 
cases. 
 340.  See VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 57, at 51 (regarding standardized forms); Uchida & 
Bynum, supra note 15, at 1056 (regarding police-developed checklist in one jurisdiction that 
included information about informant reliability). 
 341.  New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: Report of the Working 
Groups on Best Practices, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1975 (2010) [hereinafter Report of the 
Working Group].  See also Corey Fleming Hirokawa, Comment, Making the “Law of the Land” the 
Law on the Street: How Police Academies Teach Evolving Fourth Amendment Law, 49 EMORY L.J. 
295, 317 (2000) (noting that even in jurisdictions that use the Gates test, officers are trained using 
checklists based on Aguilar-Spinelli). 
 342.  Report of the Working Group, supra note 341, at 1974. 
 343.  Id. at 1975 (“police experts in the Working Group noted that police generally want to do 
a good job, and that, because police tend to be rule driven, formal rules can help them in their 
efforts to do a good job.  Police are greatly assisted by having clear expectations and written 
rules.”). 
 344.  See Griffin, supra note 339, at 986.  See also Gouldin, supra note 58, at 1380-81 
(discussing use of checklists to improve decision-making, including a recent project in the 
Manhattan District Attorney’s Office to create conviction integrity programs using similar 
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A checklist to facilitate disclosure of information in a search 
warrant application should help police combat investigative tunnel 
vision345 and make police analysis of disclosure obligations more 
systematic.346  Imposing a clear structure regarding what information 
should be compiled and disclosed can help counter cognitive biases like 
confirmation bias and selective information processing.347  That in turn 
should help police build stronger cases.348  Similarly, research from 
Continuous Quality Improvement efforts in healthcare demonstrate that 
improved performance is more likely to result from systems that provide 
support for performing a job correctly, rather than using threats to punish 
poor performance; the ABA Working Group on Brady disclosures 
pointed out that checklists serve that function well.349 
The checklist should be helpful for magistrates as well.  The major 
empirical study on search warrants noted that magistrates reviewing 
search warrant applications often used “mental checklists” to verify that 
the application contained all necessary information.350  Confirmation 
bias makes it hard, however, to notice what is missing, as it leads people 
to seek information that confirms rather than challenges an existing 
hypothesis.351  Therefore, a checklist can help overcome the potentially 
significant burden of evaluating the specifics of each case to determine 
what information should have been available and disclosed.352  The 
checklist may also help overcome some of the dangers of priming and 
implicit bias discussed above,353 as information would be presented in a 
more standardized way rather than focusing so much on the officer’s 
theory of the case.354 
principles). 
 345.  See Report of the Working Group, supra note 341, at 1975. 
 346.  See Griffin, supra note 339, at 997 (regarding creating systematic way to ensure 
information sharing). 
 347.  See Report of the Working Group, supra note 341, at 1975.  See also Burke, Talking 
About Prosecutors, supra note 306, at 2132 (discussing how prosecutors can be subject to tunnel 
vision because they are focused only on their own theory of the case, which may affect their ability 
to recognize the value of potentially exculpatory evidence). 
 348.  Report of the Working Group, supra note 341, at 1976. 
 349.  Id. at 1974-75. 
 350.  See VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 57, at 51. 
 351.  See Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 309. 
 352.  See Tim Bakken, Models of Justice to Protect Innocent Persons, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
837, 857 (2011/12) (discussing the analogous benefit of use of a checklist in Brady disclosures). 
 353.  See supra Part III.A and III.C.  See also Smith & Levinson, supra note 123, at 815-16 
(discussing the ways in which implicit bias may affect prosecutorial analysis of Brady disclosures; 
the same points could easily apply to police evaluation of information that could be included in a 
search warrant application). 
 354.  See O’Brien, Recipe for Bias, supra note 159, at 1045-46 (discussing “groupthink” and 
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Appendix A to this article proposes a sample checklist that could be 
used for search warrant applications based on informant tips.  The 
contents of that checklist are drawn from my prior article, Truth or 
Consequences: Self-Incriminating Statements and Informant Veracity, 
which argued that magistrates should consider a variety of factors when 
assessing an informant’s veracity,355 as well as on information from 
other sources.356  It also draws on the Franks cases discussed above in 
Part III, regarding the types of information that defendants argued was 
omitted but should have been included in search warrant applications. 
Much of the information in the checklist relates to the informant’s 
credibility, which is crucial for making sure magistrates make good 
probable cause determinations and for minimizing the likelihood that the 
informant will provide false information to the officers.357  Of particular 
importance is information about any benefits the informant expects to 
receive358 and the informant’s perceived risk for providing inaccurate 
information.359 
Perhaps the most controversial item in the sample checklist is the 
inclusion of questions about the race of both the informant and the 
suspect.  That information was included based on the implicit bias 
research that suggests that judges control implicit bias better when race 
is explicit rather than implicit.360  Although the research suggests that 
making race explicit may help individuals make better decisions in some 
circumstances, I am not arguing that just including race in search 
warrant documents would remove all taint from implicit bias.  Instead, 
including that information will provide greater transparency and access 
to information about the role that race and implicit bias might play, as 
studies of Dutch independent crime analysts who showed more true independence when they were 
shielded from primary investigator’s theory of the case than when they could tell the investigator’s 
theory). 
 355.  See generally Bowman, supra note 20. 
 356.  I also drew on Griffin, supra note 339, Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable, supra note 196, and 
Mosteller, supra note 28, all of which provided useful information about special concerns related to 
criminal informants. 
 357.  See supra notes 184-96 and accompanying text regarding the risks of informants shading 
testimony based on what police want to hear and the reasons that police and prosecutors may not 
detect these problems. 
 358.  See Mosteller, supra note 28, at 572 (proposing a reliability hearing for testifying 
informants, focusing on any promises or inducements); Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable, supra note 
196, at 114-15 (proposing similar reliability hearing for testifying informants, with a slightly 
broader range of material covered). 
 359.  See Bowman, supra note 20, at Part III.C.4. 
 360.  See supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.  See also Rachlinski et al., supra note 
127, at 1225 (“Control of implicit bias requires active, conscious control.”). 
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that information is currently very hard to obtain.361  If this increased 
access to racial data does demonstrate that either explicit or implicit 
bias362 is really occurring, that data would help people identify 
additional solutions.363 
But the checklist in Appendix A is really intended merely as a 
starting point for helping each jurisdiction to develop its own 
checklists.364  It might be helpful, for example, to have police, 
prosecutors, magistrates, and defense attorneys weigh in on the 
particular content and terminology that would be most helpful in a 
particular jurisdiction.365  Multiple checklists may also be helpful to deal 
with different types of crimes and different sources of information about 
the crimes; the one in Appendix A deals with search warrants based on 
informant tips, but it other checklists could be developed for situations 
involving different types of information.366 
Of course, use of a checklist should not be confused with 
acceptance of boilerplate language.  As discussed above, officers 
 361.  See supra Part IV.A.2.b regarding systemic benefits from increased transparency. 
 362.  It is possible, of course, that making race explicit could exacerbate existing explicit racial 
bias.  Although that is certainly a risk, I am persuaded by the arguments throughout the research 
discussed in this article that implicit rather than explicit bias is likely to be the most significant 
problem at this point.  Furthermore, increased access to racial data may help reveal the likely effects 
of either type of bias, compared to the currently available information. 
 363.  This article only scratches the surface on the problems of racial bias in the criminal 
justice system, and the reforms suggested here will play at best a small role in addressing those 
issues.  See, e.g., Research Working Group & Task Force on Race, the Criminal Justice System, 
Preliminary Report on Race and Washington’s Criminal Justice System, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
623, 626 (2012) (detailing several ways that race affects the criminal justice system in Washington, 
“to serve as a basis for making recommendations for changes to promote fairness, reduce disparity, 
ensure legitimate public safety objectives, and instill public confidence in our criminal justice 
system.”).  Obviously, the broad-based solutions to the larger problem are beyond the scope of this 
article, but my hope is that the discussion here of the social cognitive underpinnings of the search 
warrant problems above can provide a useful foundation for others’ suggested solutions.  See, e.g., 
Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1496-97 (2005) (arguing that social 
cognition research can be used to complement other methodologies of critical race studies and that 
modern newscast focus on crime is a “Trojan horse” that exacerbates implicit bias tendencies); and 
Johnson, supra note 138, at 361 (arguing for the importance of coalition building between African-
Americans and Latina/os to address the problem of racial profiling). 
 364.  See Griffin, supra note 339, at 997 (“Certainly, as recommended by the ABA, each 
jurisdiction could develop its own checklist. The proposed checklist in Appendix C is offered to 
assist this effort.”). 
 365.  See id. at 986 (discussing a similar recommendation in the ABA report on wrongful 
convictions). 
 366.  Report of the Working Group, supra note 341, at 1976 (“A case involving an 
informant . . . for example, might uniquely require inquiry into information such as prior cases in 
which the witness acted as an informant, prior deals bestowed upon the witness in other cases, prior 
record and dispositions in earlier cases, any recorded communications between the informant and 
others, and other such information related to the witness’s incentives and veracity.”). 
 
55
Bowman: Full Disclosure
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2014
04 BOWMAN MACRO 3 FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/1/2014  2:38 PM 
486 AKRON LAW REVIEW [47:431 
sometimes use the same language in many search warrant applications, 
and magistrates sometimes focus more on whether all the expected 
boilerplate has been included rather than on the lack of specific facts 
from which to make a meaningful review.367  Reliance on boilerplate can 
have significant negative consequences.368  Thus, the checklist in 
Appendix A and any subsequent checklists developed in particular 
jurisdictions should require that police fill in the details related to the 
items in the checklist, rather than merely checking boxes.369  After all, 
the case-specific details, rather than the general categories, are necessary 
for magistrates to provide meaningful review. 
C. Doctrinal Reform to Facilitate Defense Counsel’s Challenges to 
Warrant Validity 
“[T]o the extent that existing legal rules enforce tunnel vision, 
doctrinal reform is an obvious place to begin.”370  Many scholars who 
write about cognitive bias in the criminal justice system stress the 
importance of vigorous defense counsel in combatting that bias.371  But 
because search warrants are issued ex parte, defense counsel can only 
have a meaningful role if reviewing courts provide meaningful 
assessment of the search warrants.372  For that to happen, the Franks 
doctrine discussed above in Part II.D needs to be modified at least in 
some respects. 
1. Reform to the Preliminary Showing Required Under Franks for 
Informant Cases 
As explained above, most courts interpret the “preliminary 
showing” required under Franks in a way that makes it virtually 
impossible for the defendant to meet the standard when the affidavit is 
based primarily on information from a confidential informant.373  That 
 367.  See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. 
 368.  See supra note 64 and accompanying text.  
 369.  For example, the affiant would have to give details about any promises made to the 
informant, rather than just noting that there had been such a promise.  Similarly, the affiant would 
need to give some detail about the circumstances under which the police contacted the informant 
and any prior inconsistent statements the informant might have made.  Requiring the police to 
provide details, rather than just generalizations, also helps remove the current incentives for 
“testifying,” which is charitably described as shading the facts so that a search will be found to be 
justified.  See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 14, at 1624-25. 
 370.  Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 354. 
 371.  See, e.g., Findley, supra note 1, at 935-36. 
 372.  See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.  
 373.  See supra Part II.D.1. 
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standard is problematic not only because it incentivizes creation of 
fictitious informants,374 but also because it fails to provide the kind of 
meaningful accountability that helps overcome tunnel vision.375 
Thus, courts should adopt a standard used in Washington for such 
cases: an in-camera hearing should be conducted to examine the affiant 
and/or confidential informant if (1) the defendant offers information that 
“casts a reasonable doubt on the veracity of material representations 
made by a search warrant affiant,” and (2) “the challenged statements 
[related to information from a confidential informant] are the sole basis 
for probable cause to issue the search warrant.”376  That standard 
provides a clearer and more realistic metric for judging the sufficiency 
of the defendant’s showing, by use of the “casts a reasonable doubt” 
language.  Furthermore, the standard only applies to cases in which the 
confidential informant’s information is really the sole basis for the 
search warrant affidavit; in other cases, the defendant can attack the 
affidavit by challenging the rest of the information presented.  This 
approach would only allow the defendant to receive an in-camera 
hearing to test the affiant’s (or informant’s) credibility; it would not 
require suppression or otherwise change the showing required under 
Franks for the defendant to actually win his or her challenge.377  Instead, 
it would simply deal with the inherent impossibility of meeting the 
preliminary showing standard in informant cases, which insulates both 
deliberate wrongdoing and tunnel vision. 
2. How Use or Non-Use of a Checklist Should Affect Subsequent 
Review 
Additionally, the courts should analyze Franks omissions cases 
differently than they currently do, and that new analysis should depend 
in part on whether a checklist was used.  The new analysis should 
incentivize police to use the proposed checklist, and it should provide 
the police with more favorable review when that checklist is used.378 
 374.  See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.  
 375.  See supra notes 316-20 and accompanying text about accountability. 
 376.  State v. Casal, 699 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Wash. 1985) (emphasis in original); id. at 1238 
(distinguishing between cases where the informant’s identity is known and where the informant’s 
identity is kept confidential). 
 377.  “An in-camera hearing serves to protect the interests of both the government and the 
defendant; the Government can be protected from any significant, unnecessary impairment of 
secrecy, yet the defendant can be saved from what could be serious police misconduct.”  Id. at 1238 
(internal quotation omitted). 
 378.  The doctrine on review of search warrant applications must be crafted so that police have 
incentives to seek search warrant applications rather than perform warrantless searches and hope an 
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If police use the checklist in connection with the search warrant 
affidavit, then the existing presumption of the warrant’s validity should 
still attach.379  If the affiant failed to provide information that was asked 
for in the checklist, then the defendant should have the burden of 
showing that the police knew or should have known that information.380  
The fact that the checklist asked for the information should remove the 
inquiry about whether the information was material, which has caused 
significant problems in the Franks omissions cases.381  The checklist 
would clarify the police disclosure obligations, in answer to concerns 
about police having to speculate about what information might matter.382  
The officers would not have a duty to gather additional information, but 
the checklist would help clarify for police what information they should 
consider and disclose if that information was available.  And the 
defendant would then still bear the not-insignificant burden of showing 
that the officer-affiant actually knew or should have known the omitted 
information.  In such circumstances, the defendant should have 
increased access to in-camera review to explore this possibility, as 
discussed in the part above, but the defendant would still be required to 
make a substantial showing, and if the defendant could not meet that 
burden, then the defendant’s Franks claim would fail. 
However, if defendant does show that the police knew or should 
have known information called for in the checklist but failed to disclose 
that information, then the burden should shift to the State to show that 
the failure to disclose the information was harmless because it would not 
exception to the warrant requirement will allow admission of the resulting evidence.  See United 
States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) (noting the effect that reviewing courts’ attitudes can have 
on officers’ willingness to seek warrants). 
 379.  See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978) (courts should presume the validity of 
the warrant and defendant should have to come forward with specific allegations and an offer of 
proof to defeat that presumption). 
 380.  In some jurisdictions at least, the affiant officer often lacks first-hand knowledge of the 
contents of the investigation.  See supra note 67 and accompanying text.  It would be preferable if 
the affiant had firsthand knowledge of the investigative information gathered, but the defendant 
should not get caught in a trap regarding showing who knew what information.  Instead, the 
defendant should only have to show that investigators involved in the case knew or should have 
known relevant omitted information; the defendant should not have to make a heightened showing 
regarding the extent of communication between officers involved in the investigation. 
 381.  See supra notes 228-234 and accompanying text (discussing corroboration, which is often 
key to materiality analysis). 
 382.  See United States v. Colkley, 889 F.2d 297, 301 (4th Cir. 1990) (justifying the increased 
skepticism of Franks omissions cases in part because of an unacceptable risk that officers would be 
open to “endless conjecture about investigative leads, fragments of information, or other matter that 
might, if included, have redounded to defendant’s benefit.”). 
 
58
Akron Law Review, Vol. 47 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol47/iss2/4
04 BOWMAN MACRO 3 FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/1/2014  2:38 PM 
2014] FULL DISCLOSURE 489 
have changed the magistrate’s probable cause analysis.383  The court 
could still find that the information was not material, perhaps because of 
police corroboration of the informant’s tip, other evidence of the 
informant’s reliability, or because the informant’s tip only played a 
small part in the overall showing of probable cause.  But the prosecutor 
would bear the burden of proof of demonstrating probable cause, rather 
than the current situation that puts the burden on the defendant to defeat 
probable cause. 
In cases in which a checklist was used but the defendant objected to 
the failure to disclose information that was not called for by the 
checklist, then the current standards would still remain in place.  That is, 
the defendant would still have to prove that the omission was both 
material and intentionally or recklessly designed to mislead.384  That 
standard would likely be difficult to meet, as it is now, although courts 
should still make a more careful and nuanced inquiry into those issues, 
as discussed above in Part III.B.2, and the defendant should be able to 
get in-camera review if needed, as discussed above in Part IV.C.1. 
If officers did not use a checklist, however, then the standards 
should be more favorable to the defendant.  The court should presume 
that the affiant knew that the kind of information called for by the 
checklist could be material to the probable cause determination.  
Therefore, if the affiant failed to use the checklist and the defendant 
made a substantial preliminary showing that the undercut the affiant’s 
version, as discussed above in the previous subsection, then the police 
should bear the burden of proof regarding both intent (whether the police 
intended to mislead) and materiality (whether the information matters to 
the probable cause determination).  With respect to intent, the police 
officer should have to come forward with specific information about 
why the omitted information was not provided or why the false 
statement was included, and the reviewing court would have to 
determine that the officer’s conduct did not even show recklessness.  
Furthermore, the officer should have to bear the burden of proving that 
probable cause exists without regard to the Franks error. 
Even under this revised formulation of Franks, the police should 
 383.  This approach is modeled on Professor Griffin’s analogous suggestions regarding 
modifying the burden of proof for Brady disclosures depending on use of a checklist.  See Griffin, 
supra note 339, at 999-1000 (justifying burden shifting based on clarity of disclosure obligations). 
 384.  See Colkley, 899 F.2d at 301 (discussing the standards for what defendants must prove 
for Franks omissions challenges).  See also Griffin, supra note 339, at 1000 (arguing that the burden 
in Brady cases should stay on the defense when information was not called for in the proposed 
checklist). 
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still have adequate incentive to get search warrants in cases based on 
informant information.  After all, obtaining a search warrant provides 
significant evidence that qualified immunity should attach to officers 
facing civil suits over allegedly unlawful searches.385  Furthermore, 
empirical evidence provides some support for the idea that getting a 
search warrant may help prevent later suppression of the evidence 
seized.386  Empirical evidence also provides at least some support for the 
idea that search warrant usage has increased, at least in some types of 
cases and in some circumstances.387  Additionally, technological 
advances have made it easier than ever for officers to obtain warrants.388  
Therefore, the additional “burden” of completing a checklist while 
preparing the application should be minimal, and the checklist may 
actually make warrant applications easier to complete, as they provide 
clear directions about what types of information should be included.  
Furthermore, although the defendant would now more easily be able to 
challenge the validity of search warrants, police should have an easier 
time in knowing what information should be provided because of the 
checklist, and the revised test described above does not impose on police 
a duty to do additional investigation.  The magistrate would still be 
asked to make a common-sense determination about the existence of 
probable cause,389 and the modifications to the test still leave ample 
room for the reviewing court to uphold the adequacy of the search 
 385.  Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235 (2012). 
 386.  See, e.g., Uchida & Bynam, supra note 15, at 1064 (discussing findings of several studies 
showing that the exclusionary rule very rarely leads to “lost cases”).  This empirical evidence is not 
definitive, as it does not demonstrate the effect of getting a warrant versus proceeding without a 
warrant on the same facts.  Even without evidence of that comparison, however, the existing 
evidence suggests that at least in some cases, seeking a warrant helps police officers make better 
decisions about their investigations.  See id. at 1065-66 (discussing the incentive that the 
exclusionary rule provides in helping ensure that police comply with the Fourth Amendment and the 
efforts of police officers to improve warrant applications in order to comply with the law and 
preserve admission of evidence obtained). 
 387.  See, e.g., Jonathan Witmer-Rich, Covert, Delayed Notice Searching: A Constitutional 
and Policy Failure –and a Solution (work-in progress on file with author, discussing vast expansion 
of delayed notice covert search warrants, including in routine federal criminal investigations); 
Uchida & Bynam, supra note 15, at 1034 (discussing increased use of search warrants in state 
courts, particularly in drug cases, during the late 1980s). 
 388.  See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 14, at 1672 (discussing various techniques to 
improve access to warrants, including increased use of telephonic warrants, use of Skype to 
facilitate judicial authorization of blood-draws from DUI suspects, and even judges being present at 
DUI checkpoints to issue warrants). 
 389.  See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230, 239 (1983). This proposal is not inconsistent 
with Gates’ flexible approach because it does not impose any particular formal requirements, either 
on police about what evidence they must uncover or magistrates regarding how they must assess 
probable cause. 
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warrant.  This article also echoes the call from other scholars to 
reinvigorate the warrant requirement and minimize reliance on 
exceptions,390 although these proposals do not depend on that change. 
These changes would, admittedly, lead to more suppression of 
evidence for violations of Franks.  From the perspective of the cognitive 
bias research, however, the highly visible nature of suppression has 
several benefits.  For example, suppression of evidence in some cases 
should help mitigate overconfidence bias in police, helping them make 
better predictions about the likelihood of their illegal conduct being 
detected and punished, which should in turn deter some unlawful 
searches.391  Professor LaFave notes the importance of deterrence as a 
justification for the exclusionary rule, as well as its appropriateness in 
Franks cases where the officers have misled the magistrate who issued a 
search warrant.392  Similarly, Professor Taslitz notes the error-reduction 
that is likely to result from suppression incentivizing officers to do 
investigations that are more thorough in the first place.393  And that is the 
real goal of the reforms suggested in this article – not increased 
suppression of evidence seized, but improved search warrant 
applications in the first place.394  That goal is consistent with 
exclusionary rule studies suggesting that it incentivizes better police 
decision-making without resulting in significant numbers of “lost cases” 
due to suppression of the evidence.395 
 390.  See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 14. 
 391.  Lammon, supra note 165, at 1137-38.  See also id. at 1139 (“when we reject the 
assumption that police officers (or anyone else for that matter) are able to accurately calculate the 
costs and benefits of their conduct, and instead acknowledge that police systematically deviate from 
rational behavior, the force of exclusion becomes evident.”).  See also Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra 
note 14, at 1614 (“In a sense, a firm warrant requirement makes the Fourth Amendment self-
enforcing; its clear enforcement ex post will serve to deter Fourth Amendment violations ex ante by 
optimizing police conduct.”). 
 392.  LAFAVE, supra note 34, at Sec. 4.4, just after note 19. 
 393.  Taslitz, Police Are People Too, supra note 29, at 65.  As noted above, I am not arguing 
for an expanded duty to investigate, but use of the checklist should help officers think about their 
investigations more consistently and effectively. 
 394.  To the extent that officers are engaging in deliberate wrongdoing rather than just falling 
victim to cognitive biases, use of the checklist should help make it harder for them to fabricate 
informants, and it would make it easier for defense counsel to challenge fabricated information 
through subsequent litigation.  See notes 94-96 (regarding the danger of police making fabricating 
the existence of informants); 369 (regarding testifying). 
 395.  See Uchida & Bynam, supra note 15, at 1064-66 (discussing the conclusions to their 
study, which were consistent with previous studies showing limited numbers of “lost cases” due to 
the exclusionary rule). 
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3. Cautious Reliance on Corroboration 
Many scholars have suggested that increased use of corroboration is 
an important part of the solution to the problems of informant 
unreliability and incentives to lie.396  They argue that given the 
incentives for informants to tailor their stories to match the police or 
prosecutor’s theory of the case, the courts should weight more heavily 
corroboration of the informant’s story.397  At least one study suggests 
that police frequently seek corroboration of informant tips,398 and the 
courts often rely heavily on corroboration when rejecting Franks 
challenges.399  But increased reliance on corroboration is somewhat 
problematic. 
First, confirmation bias makes it hard to evaluate the appropriate 
weight of corroboratory evidence, in that confirmation bias both leads to 
overvaluing of details that are not really significant and undervaluing 
disconfirmatory evidence.  That is perhaps why the case law on 
corroboration has been particularly problematic.400  In some high-profile 
cases, and probably other cases that are not so high profile, courts 
thought that informants’ tips were corroborated, only to discover that the 
corroboration was flawed.401 
Second, and closely related, there is an inferential problem in 
relying on corroboration of innocent details to assume that the informant 
must also be correct about claims regarding criminal activity.  Professor 
Erlinder correctly notes that “accurate predictions of legal conduct 
reveal virtually nothing about the reliability or accuracy of allegations of 
illegal conduct.”402  Thus, for corroboration to be useful, it must confirm 
not just general familiarity with the person being implicated, but more 
specific information about criminal activity. 
Third, that more specific type of corroboration is often unavailable.  
Instead, informants’ stories are hard to corroborate or contradict in cases 
 396.  See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 56, at 141 (recommending that officers try to 
corroborate all information from informants and avoid relying on informants in warrant applications 
unless absolutely necessary). 
 397.  See, e.g., Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux, supra note 18, at 1147 (arguing that 
corroboration should be “one prerequisite for relying on an informant’s tip.”). 
 398.  Benner & Samarkos, supra note 11, at 243. 
 399.  See supra notes 225-229 and accompanying text. 
 400.  See generally Erlinder, supra note 44 (detailing and extensively critiquing the evolution 
of the Supreme Court precedent regarding use of corroboration to bolster informant tips). 
 401.  See supra note 17. 
 402.  Erlinder, supra note 44, at 3 (paraphrasing Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in Florida v. J.L., 
529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000)). 
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where their testimony is the central evidence against the defendant.403  In 
other words, informants are “most needed when [they are] providing 
otherwise unprovable facts, which thus cannot be corroborated.”404  
Prosecutors and police may thus offer leniency or otherwise incentivize 
informant tips in precisely the cases where corroboration is unavailable, 
increasing the risk that informant information will be false.405  Thus, 
while corroboration can certainly be helpful, and while police should be 
encouraged to corroborate informants’ tips, courts need to be cautious 
about relying too heavily on corroboration.  And in cases where 
corroboration is unavailable, courts should carefully scrutinize the 
circumstances surrounding the informants’ tip, to make sure those 
circumstances suggest that the informant is credible. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Cognitive biases likely affect the search warrant process, 
particularly when informants are involved, in several subtle but 
important ways.  Implicit bias may affect who becomes an informant and 
who becomes a suspect for whom a search warrant is sought.  
Investigative tunnel vision can exacerbate a premature focus on an 
individual, affecting both what evidence is sought and how that evidence 
is interpreted.  Tunnel vision can also contribute to officers not 
disclosing a complete picture of the investigation or of the informant’s 
reliability to the magistrate, undermining the magistrate’s role in 
providing a neutral evaluation of the basis for the search.  Magistrates’ 
review of these applications can also be affected by framing, priming, 
and implicit bias.  When the resulting search turns up no evidence, the 
situation is shielded from later review.  When the search does turn up 
evidence and criminal charges are filed, hindsight bias as well as 
confirmation bias can affect judicial review of the evidence presented.  
The current case law, both formally and as usually interpreted, fails to 
provide a meaningful remedy. 
These problems are complex, and some of the effects discussed 
here are speculative; it would be helpful if more empirical research was 
done to verify some of the conclusions I have drawn here.  And the 
search warrant process will always be affected to some extent by the 
cognitive processes described above, particularly because search 
warrants are issued ex parte.  Nevertheless, the solutions described 
 403.  Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable, supra note 196, at 113. 
 404.  Mosteller, supra note 28, at 551-52. 
 405.  See id. at 554. 
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above should help improve decision-making in the search warrant 
process.  Full disclosure, in various forms, should help mitigate those 
biases. 
Increased education of magistrates, police, and judges can help 
them approach the process with a somewhat different frame of mind.  
Police should be encouraged to use a checklist of information about 
informants that should be provided to the magistrate, both to help their 
own case evaluations and to enable the magistrate to provide more 
thorough and meaningful review.  Those changes may mean that in 
marginal cases, warrants are not sought or granted.  It may also help 
reduce the role of implicit bias in decisions to seek or grant warrants.  
When warrants are issued, defense counsel should have some greater 
room to challenge the warrants because of checklist usage and 
corresponding changes to the Franks doctrine.  Reviewing judges may 
then be better able to resist confirmation and hindsight biases.  These 
reforms, adopted together, should help improve the process of decision-
making without unduly hampering the ability of police to investigate 
crime. 
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APPENDIX A – SAMPLE CHECKLIST FOR REQUIRED DISCLOSURES FOR 
SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVITS BASED ON INFORMANT TIPS406 
When a search warrant application includes information from one 
or more informants, this checklist should be used to make sure the 
magistrate is provided with sufficient information to evaluate the role of 
that tip in contributing to the probable cause determination.  This 
information must be provided based on the knowledge of all officers 
involved in the investigation in any way who have had contact with the 
informant.  When the checklist is used, there should be space included 
for detailed information to be provided; that extra space has been 
eliminated in this printing. 
 
1. General information about the informant. 
a. How informant came to attention of police officer. 
b. Prior criminal record. 
c. Current or former mental or physical impairment. 
d. Pending or contemplated charges against the informant 
(including known or suspected criminal activity by the 
informant). 
2. Information about informant’s motives or benefits that may be 
received for information. 
a. Informant’s relationship to the target of the warrant 
application. 
b. Was the informant involved in the criminal activity 
under investigation? 
c. Promises or offers of immunity or leniency for 
informant’s criminal activity (written or unwritten). 
d. Monetary inducement. 
e. Other benefits the informant might expect to receive. 
3. Other information. 
a. Who was present when informant provided information 
to police? 
b. Did the informant make any prior inconsistent 
statements related to the criminal activity currently 
under investigation, or recant the information provided 
to police? 
 406.  As noted above, this checklist could be used as drafted, or it could be used as a basis for 
jurisdictions coming up with their own checklists for search warrants based on informant 
information. 
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c. Informant’s track record of providing useful 
information to police in the past (including arrests, 
convictions, and previous information that turned out to 
be inaccurate). 
d. Any record of current or former mental or physical 
impairment. 
e. Any other information relevant to the informant’s 
credibility. 
f. Race of the informant. 
g. Race of the target of the investigation. 
4. Information about corroboration. 
a. What (if any) information provided by the informant 
was successfully corroborated? 
b. What (if any) information was attempted to be 
corroborated, without success? 
c. What (if any) information provided by the informant 
was shown to be inaccurate by subsequent 
investigation? 
d. Was any of the informant’s information contradicted by 
scientific tests? 
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